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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case # 981654-CA
Priority #

v.
KAREN MAAS
Defendant/Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF CASE AND JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This case was tried before a jury in the Seventh Judicial
District Court in and for Grand County, State of Utah.

Defendant

was found guilty of Falsely signing Evidence of Financial Card
Transaction, a third-degree felony; Unlawful use of Financial
Transaction, a class B misdemeanor; and Property Obtained by
Unlawful Financial Transaction Card Conduct, a class B
misdemeanor.

Appellant appeals from this decision.

The Utah

Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to
CODE ANN. § 7 8 - 2 A - 3 ( E )

UTAH

(1953), as amended.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS, STATEMENT OF ISSUES
PRESENTED ON APPEAL, AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

Issue 1. Defendant
Miranda

silence

was denied

was used against

a fair

trial

because

her

post-

her.

Standard of Review. Whether use of post-Miranda silence
against defendant is harmful error is a mixed question of fact

and law reviewed with some deference to the trial Court.

State

v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994).
The issue was preserved during the course of the trial. (Tr.
at pp. 47-49).

Although Defense counsel failed to object to the

prosecutor's reference to Defendant's silence during closing and
during the viewing of the video, nonetheless, this failure is not
fatal to Defendant's appeal.

In State v. Morrison, 937 P.2d 1293

(Utah App. 1997), no objection or request for a curative
instruction was made by defense, but since it was plain error to
fail to object, this Court still addressed this issue on appeal
and reversed the trial Court's decision.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
During the Fall of 1997, the defendant, Karen Maas worked at
the Alco Department Store in Moab, Utah.

On December 14, 1997, a

customer came into the store and made a purchase which he charged
to his credit card.

(R005)

The Alco records indicate that this

charge was made to a register that Ms. Maas was working that
evening.(R005)
Approximately 3 0 minutes after this customer made his
purchase, a second purchase was also made on his credit card
account. (R005) This second purchase was also rung through the
register to which Ms. Maas was assigned that evening. (005) When
this customer received his credit card bill, he contacted Alco to
dispute the second charge claiming that he had not been the one
who made this second purchase. (R004-005) The second purchase was
-2-

an American Camper brand camping set which included four sleeping
bags, a tent, a campstove, a lantern, a picnic set, a flashlight,
and a first aid kit. (R005) According to Ms. Maas, the person who
purchased this large camping set later tried to return it to the
store for cash, but was unable to as store policy did not allow
for a cash return on a credit card purchase. (Tr. at p.69) Ms.
Maas, however, offered to buy the items herself.

She didn't have

any money with her to make this purchase, so she gave this
customer her home address asking him to bring this camping set to
her home so she could purchase it from him later that evening.
(Tr. at p. 71-72) Some time later, Ms. Maas needed money, so she
pawned this camping set. (Tr. at p. 74) She did not take this
camping set to a pawnshop out of the area, but instead took it
directly to a local shop where she pawned it in her own name.
Ms. Maas was aware that police routinely check pawn shops for
stolen items. (Tr. at p. 75)
After the credit card holder contacted the store regarding
his dispute to the charge on his account, the police were
contacted and Ms. Maas

was confronted by Officer Neil, a local

Sheriff regarding this matter. (Tr. at p. 48; 76-77) After a
brief conversation with this officer, Ms. Maas decided to invoke
her right to silence and not speak with this officer regarding
this matter. (Tr. at p. 48; 77) Ms. Maas was later arrested and
charged with Falsely signing Evidence of Financial Card
Transaction, a third-degree felony; Unlawful use of Financial

•o-

Transaction, a class B misdemeanor; and Property Obtained by
Unlawful Financial Transaction Card Conduct, a class B
misdemeanor.
During the trial, Officer Neil testified that Ms. Maas had
refused to speak to him after being read her Miranda

rights. (Tr.

at p.48) Defense counsel attempted to prevent this evidence from
coming in, but was unable to do so.

Ms. Maas testified as to

her version of what had occurred. (Tr. at pp. 66-82) The credit
card holder testified that he did not make the second purchase.
(Tr. at p. 15)

A friend of Ms. Maas testified that he had been

home on the evening that she received the camping set at her
home. (Tr. at pp. 59-60) Ms. Maas' friend testified that a man
brought the camp set to Karen's home to sell it to her. (Tr. at
pp. 59-60) No one testified that they saw Ms. Maas commit this

1

The following colloquy took place in a Bench Conference prior to Officer Neil's
testimony:
MR. SHULTZ: I'm going to make an objection to any questions about whether or
not he attempted to interview Ms. Maas. Ms. Maas refused to talk to him, she
declined to talk to him, and I think that would be an improper comment in
exercising her Fifth Amendment right now at this time. She didn't exercise her
Fifth Amendment right, but she did refuse to talk to Deputy - MR. BENGE: Well, the comment she made before refusing to comment is, I
think, the way she - THE COURT: What did she say?
MR. BENGE: She said, Well, you have everything out, I don't have anything else
to say.
THE COURT: I think I'll let that in.
MR. SCHULTZ: We're on the record. My objection went on the record?
THE COURT: Yes, I think so.
(Tr. at pp. 47)
-4-

crime or leave the store with this camping equipment. (Tr. at pp.
4-82) Consequently, all of the evidence against the defendant was
circumstantial as was conceded by the State during opening
argument. (Tr. at p. 8)
During closing argument, the prosecutor argued that Ms. Maas
was a liar and stated, "In order for you to believe the
defendant's story. . .You would have to disregard that when Kim
Neil went to the defendant's house, showed her the evidence,
asked if she had anything to say about it she said 'No, you have
everything, anyway.' " (Tr. at p. 111-112)
During deliberation, the jury requested that they be allowed
to review the transcript of Officer Neil's testimony and that of
another witness for the State. (Tr. at pp. 112-113; 115) The
Court replayed for the jury the video tape of Officer Neil's
testimony and again, the jury heard Officer Neil testify that Ms.
Maas refused to speak to him after being informed of her right to
remain silent. (Tr. at p. 77) Defense counsel made no objection
to this.
Shortly after reviewing the testimony of these two
prosecution witnesses, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on
all counts. (Tr. at p. 116; R101-103)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This case involves the State's use of defendant, Ms. Maas'
post-Miranda silence at trial.

Here the state improperly used

Ms. Maas' silence against her and this error was harmful.
-5-

The United States Supreme Court has held that, under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
prosecution may not use a defendant's post-Miranda
silence for impeachment purposes. .See Doyle v\ Ohio,
426 U.S. 610, 619, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 2245, 49 L.Ed.2d 91
(1976) . Similarly, the prosecution may not use a
defendant's post-Miranda silence as substantive
evidence of guilt. See United States
v. Tenorio,
69
th
F.3d 1103, 1106 (11 Cir. 1995) (citing Wainwright
v.
Greenfield,
474 U.S. 284, 295, 106 S.CT. 634, 640-41,
88 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986)). The prosecution's use of postMiranda silence " 'prejudice[s] the defendant by
attempting to create an inference of guilt in the
jury's mind.' " United States
v. Newman, 943 F.2d
1155, 1157 (9 Cir. 1991) (quoting United States
v.
Wyeoff,
545 F.2d 679, 681 (9tq Cir 1976). 2
State v. Byrd. 937 P.2d 532, 534 (Utah App. 1997)
State and Federal case law support Ms. Maas ' position that
the error which occurred in allowing her post-Miranda

silence to

be used against her was harmful and a new trial is warranted.
State v. Morrison. 937 P.2d 1293, 1297 (Utah App. 1997); Velarde
v. Shulsen. 757 F.2d 1093 (10th Circuit 1985); State v. Byrd, 937
P.2d 532, 534 (Utah App. 1997).
Here the State used Ms. Maas' silence to suggest that she
was a liar.

The jury was exposed to three references to her

post-Miranda silence and no curative instruction was given.
Because this case comes down to a credibility contest between Ms.

2

See also State
v. Saunders,
98 0hioApp.3d 355, 648 N.E.2d
587, 590 (1994) (noting effect of prosecutor's comment was to
suggest guilt of defendant, "because an innocent person would not
have remained silent.").

-6-

Maas' account of what happened and the State's request that the
jury infer her guilt from purely circumstantial evidence, the
error of allowing in this testimony was harmful and requires
reversal.

ARGUMENT
I.
THE PROSECUTION'S USE OF DEFENDANT'S POST-MIRANDA
SILENCE WAS HARMFUL ERROR.
The United States Supreme Court has held that, under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
prosecution may not use a defendant's post-Miranda
silence for impeachment purposes. See Doyle v. Ohio,
426 U.S. 610, 619, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 2245, 49 L.Ed.2d 91
(1976) . Similarly, the prosecution may not use a
defendant's post-Miranda silence as substantive
evidence of guilt. See United States
v. Tenorio,
69
F.3d 1103, 1106 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Wainwright
v.
Greenfield,
474 U.S. 284, 295, 106 S.CT. 634, 640-41,
88 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986)). The prosecution's use of postMiranda silence " 'prejudice[s] the defendant by
attempting to create an inference of guilt in the
jury's mind.' " United States
v. Newman, 943 F.2d
1155, 1157 (9" Cir. 1991) (quoting United
States
v.
n
3
Wyeoff,
545 F.2d 679, 681 (9" Cir 1976).
State v. Byrd, 937 P.2d 532, 534 (Utah App. 1997)
The basic principle behind Doyle is the fundamental
unfairness of implicitly assuring a suspect that his silence will

3

See also State
v. Saunders,
98 0hioApp.3d 355, 648 N.E.2d
587, 590 (1994) (noting effect of prosecutor's comment was to
suggest guilt of defendant, "because an innocent person would not
have remained silent.").

-7-

not be used against him and then using his silence to impeach an
explanation subsequently offered at trial.
P.2d 262, 267 (Utah 1998) discussing

State v. Harmon. 956

Doyle v. Ohio. 426 U.S. 610;

96 S.Ct. 2240, 2245; 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976).
The mere mention that a defendant invoked his Constitutional
rights does not prima
Id.

at 268.

facie

establish a due process violation.

If, however, the State in some way uses the

defendant's silence to undermine the exercise of those rights
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, a Doyle violation has
occurred.

State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 267 (Utah 1998)

discussing

Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610; 96 S.Ct. 2240, 2245; 49

L.Ed.2d 91 (1976).
If such constitutional error does occur, the State bears the
burden of demonstrating that the improperly elicited testimony
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt

State v. Morrison, 93 7

P.2d 1293, 1297 (Utah App. 1997). Reversal will result whenever
the State cannot show that the error was not harmful.

Velarde v.

Shulsen, 757 F.2d 1093 (10th Circuit 1985) In evaluating whether
an evidentiary error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the
court will focus on whether there is a reasonable possibility
that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the
conviction. Morrison at

1296.

In determining whether the evidence was harmful, the
Morrison Court considered the following factors as established in
-8-

State v. Reyes, 861 P.2d 1055 (Utah App. 1993) :
. . ."(1) whether the jury would 'naturally and
necessarily construe' the comment as referring to
defendant's silence; (2) whether there was overwhelming
evidence of defendant's guilt; (3) whether the evidence
was isolated; and (4) whether the trial Court
instructed the jury not to draw any adverse presumption
from defendant's decision not to testify."
Morrison at 1296-97.
Defendant Morrison was arrested and convicted of possession
of a controlled substance and possession of a weapon by a
restricted person.

This arrest took place in his own home in his

bedroom. A handgun was found in a drawer that contained
Morrison's personal items.

Morrison declined to speak to police

after his girlfriend called her attorney and was instructed that
neither she nor he should make a statement.

At trial, Morrison's

girlfriend claimed responsibility for the drugs and Morrison's
father took responsibility for the gun.

The prosecutor

questioned both defendant and his girlfriend about the fact that
they would not speak to police.
objection to this.

Defense counsel made no

The defendant was convicted and he appealed.

This Court found that even though defense counsel failed to
object to the prosecutors questions that the trial Court
committed plain error by allowing the improper testimony into
evidence.

This Court then undertook to determine whether the

error prejudiced the defendant. Applying the "-Reyes factors,"
this Court first considered whether the jury would naturally and
necessarily construe the comments as referring to the defendant's
-9-

silence and found that the "clear implication of the testimonies
was that Morrison might have given incriminating information,"
but for his girlfriend's entreaty to remain silent.

Id.

Next

this Court considered the fact that the improper references were
not isolated in that they occurred twice in a one-and-a-half day
trial.

Moreover, the Court noted that greater significance would

attach to improper evidence of defendant's post-arrest silence
because the trial was relatively short taking only a day and a
half.

Additionally, the trial court gave no curative

instruction--a factor weighing against harmless error.
Accordingly, the court found:
. . . the sole Reyes factor
the State may rely on to
establish harmless error is whether the evidence of
Morrison's guilt was overwhelming. In determining
whether the evidence was so overwhelming as to overcome
the constitutional error in this case, we examine both
the amount of evidence indicating guilt as well and the
nature of the State's case and of the defendant's
defense. For instance, we may consider: (1) whether
the State's case is based on circumstantial rather than
direct evidence; (2) the plausibility of any
exculpatory explanation for the set of circumstances
leading to the charges; (3) whether the case depends
primarily on the resolution of conflicting evidence
consisting of uncorroborated and conflicting
testimonies; and (4) the extent to which the defense
rested on the defendant's credibility.
State v. Morrison, 937 P.2d 1293, 1296-97 (Utah App.
1997) See Velarde,
757 F.2d at 1095; Byrd, 937 P.2d at
536-37.
While the Morrison Court agreed that the evidence against
the defendant was fairly strong, it was nevertheless mostly

-10-

circumstantial.

Defendant's explanation, although unlikely, was

not implausible.

Thus, the defendant's exculpatory explanation

was crucial and the case turned in large part on his credibility.
As such, the Court was not convinced that the evidence of
Morrison's guilt was overwhelming and reversed his conviction.
In State v. Byrd, 937 P.2d 532 (Utah App. 1997), the Court
again considered this issue and reversed where defendant's postMiranda silence was used against him at trial.

Here, the State

made two references to the defendant's post-Miranda silence.
First, the prosecutor elicited the testimony from the officer
where he stated as follows:
A. I advised this person, or the defendant, of his
rights. I went through the four steps that are
necessary, asked him if he would talk to me. He
agreed, whcih was a waiver of his rights. And then
proceeded to talk to the defendant.
Q.

Then what happened?

A.

Do you want me to go through the discussions?

Q.

Yes.

A. Okay. I first off told the defendant that I had
him on tape buying drugs at Pioneer Park.
Q.

What did the defendant say as to that?

A.

He didn't say anything.

He didn't move his head.

Byrd at 535.
Later, on cross-examination of defendant, the prosecutor
used defendant's post-Miranda silence to impeach his earlier
exculpatory testimony.

-11-

Q. [Prosecutor] : You talked to the officer after he
had advised you of your Miranda warnings?
A.
[Defendant]: No, I didn't.
Q. Do you remember him giving you the Miranda
warnings?
A. I can't remember if he did or not.
Q. So it could have been or it could not have been;
that's what you are saying?
A. I just know. . .1 didn't talk to him.
Q. You certainly did not say anything to him about the
driver buying these drugs, did you?
A. I didn't say anything about no drugs, period.
Id. at 535.
Based upon this line of questioning and the answers
elicited, this Court found that the prosecution was "clearly"
trying to use the defendant's post-Miranda silence against him to
impeach his testimony at trial.

This Court stated as follows:

. . .because "virtually any description of defendant's
silence following arrest and Miranda warning will
constitute a Doyle violation," United States
v. Shaw,
791 F.2d 367, 382 (5tn Cir 1983), we conclude that the
State violated defendant's right to due process.4
State v. Byrd, 937 P.2d 532, 535 (Utah App. 1997)
The State argued that any constitutional violation was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

In analyzing this claim the

Court first considered whether the jury could have construed the
improper evidence as referring to anything but defendant's post-

4

See Doyle,
426 U.S. at 619, 96 S.Ct. at 2245; Tenorio,
69
F.3d at 1106; see also United States
v. Batter,
91 F.3d 427, 43740 (3d Cir) (assuming, but not holding, that Doyle was violated
where prosecutor commented on defendant's silence following
Miranda warning and subsequent waiver of Miranda right(s), cert.
denied
U.S.
, 117 S. Ct. 517-18, 136 L.Ed.2d 406
(1996).
-12-

Miranda

silence and determined that it could not have.

Next, the Byrd court considered whether the prosecutor's use of
defendant's silence was "isolated."

The prosecutor introduced

defendant's post-Miranda silence on two occasions at trial.

Although

no comment was made during closing argument, both references occurred
on the same day of the trial, which lasted only one and one-half
days. The Court noted that the defendant was cross-examined shortly
before the defense rested and the jury retired to deliberate.
Therefore, although the prosecutor made only two references to the
defendant's silence, both the short length of the trial and the
timing of the prosecutor's references tended to weigh against the
State on this factor. The court next considered whether the State
offered overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt.
Here, the officer testified that he thought he saw Defendant
purchase drugs

The defendant testified that someone else in the car

bought the drugs.

Neither the State nor defendant offered

corroborating evidence to support either version of these events.
Thus the jury m

this case had to resolve several points of

conflicting evidence to find defendant guilty because both the State
and defendant offered conflicting versions of events surrounding the
alleged incident and the arrest. As such, the case came down to a
one-on-one situation, i.e., the word of the defendant against the
word of the key prosecution witnesses. This Court noted as follows:
Courts have concluded that undisputed direct evidence of
the defendant's guilt may constitute overwhelming evidence.
. . Courts have generally refused, however, to conclude
-13-

that evidence was overwhelming in cases that ultimately
rested on the jury's resolution of conflicting evidence,
particularly where the defendant's credibility is
involved.5
State v. Byrd, 937 P.2d 532, 536 (Utah App.1997)
Accordingly, the Byrd Court found that under these
circumstances, they could not say that the evidence against
defendant in this case was overwhelming.
Lastly, the Byrd Court considered the fact that no curative
instruction was given and entered the ruling as follows:
Because "'there is a reasonable possibility that the
evidence complained of might have contributed to the
conviction,'" we conclude that the prosecutor's use of
defendant's post-Miranda silence in this case was not
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, (footnote omitted)
State v. Byrd, 937 P.2d 532, 537 (Utah App. 1997)
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has also spoken on this
issue.

In Velarde v. Shulsen, 757 P.2d 1093 (10tn Cir. 1985),

the Court considered the harmfulness of a Doyle violation.

In

Velarde, the defendant was cross-examined regarding his postarrest post-Miranda warning silence as follows:

5

See Velarde
v. Shulsen,
151 F.2d 1093, 1095 (10th Cir. 1986)
(per curiam) (emphasizing Doyle error not harmless in cases
resting primarily on circumstantial evidence and uncorroborated
and conflicting testimonies of defendant and prosecution
witnesses); White v. State,
647 N.E.2d 684, 688 (Ind.Ct.App.
1995) (finding Doyle error not harmless where defendant's trial
"came down to a credibility judgment; it was the victims' word
against [defendant's]"); Aesoph v. Stats,
102 Nev. 316, 721 P.2d
379, 383 (1986) (noting "defendant's credibility before the jury
was crucial to his defense.")

-14-

Q. Mr. Velarde, on that evening, why didn't you tell
Officer Nelson your side of the story? [defense
counsel's objection is overruled]
A. 'cause [sic] he read me my Miranda rights, and I
felt that I didn't have to answer him any questions
that would put my, that would be used against me in a
court of law.
Q. Mr. Velarde, haven't you repeatedly told Mr. Nelson
after the Miranda Warning, I think, that you couldn't
remember anything?
A. Well, that's just like not talkin' to him.
Q. Now but, Mr. Velarde, have you repeatedly told Mr.
Nelson upon direct questioning from him you did not,
that you didn't want to talk because of your legal
rights, but simply you couldn't remember anything?
(Vol. II at 146-147)
Q. And is it your position, Mr. Velarde, that, do I
understand your testimony correctly, is that you chose
not to tell Mr. Nelson anything because you don't trust
police officers?
A. That's correct.
Q. So you have elected to go forward with this entire
criminal prosecution, be arrested for vehicle theft,
and wait until today for the first time to give your
version of what happened? [defense counsel's objection
is overruled by the Court]
(Vol. II at 149)
Q. Mr. Velarde, this is the first time that you have
elected to state your version of what occurred in Salt
Lake County and in Morgan County, is that true?
A. Well yea, it's the first time I have said anything
about the case. This is -Q. And that, and notwithstanding, that this offense
occurred in excess of six weeks ago?
A. What do you mean by that?
Q. For six weeks you have chosen to remain silent and
to utilize just today to say -A. I have talked to my attorney.
(Vol. II at 151)
Id.

at 1096-1097.

The defendant was convicted and appealed first in the State
Court where he was unsuccessful and then to the Tenth Circuit.
The Federal magistrate concluded that there was error but that it
was harmless.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
-15-

reversed finding that the prosecution's questions and remarks did
not constitute harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.
In doing so, the Velarde Court noted that the only evidence
linking the defendant to the theft was the State's witness who
had admitted driving the stolen truck and who defendant claimed
had given him a ride.

The Court noted that under these

circumstances that petitioner's version of the events is not so
implausible that it can be said that the jury was unaffected by
the prosecutor's comments on his post-arrest silence.
The Velarde court also noted that where the jury's
evaluation of the defendant's credibility goes to the very
essence of the case, the admisability of tainted evidence cannot
be considered harmless.

Moreover, the Velarde Court noted that

the entire case against the defendant was circumstantial--a fact
which weighs against a conclusion of harmless error.
As in Byrd and Morrison, the Court in Velarde found that
the case came down to a one-on-one situation--the word of the
defendant against the word of the State's witness.

Therefore,

with no corroborating evidence on either side, the importance of
the defendant's credibility is so vital that an unconstitutional
attack upon it cannot be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Accordingly, the decision of the lower courts was reversed.
The Defendant here, Ms. Karen Maas' (hereinafter "Ms. Maas")
case is quite similar to that of Morrison, Byrd, and Velarde, and
as in those cases, the decision of the trial Court should be
-16-

reversed.
Here, the prosecutor elicited evidence of Ms. Maasf postMiranda silence from Officer Neil as follows:
Q. What was the nature of your conversation with Ms.
Maas?
A. I met with Karen, I identified myself. I explained
the reason I was there was I was investigating misuse
of a credit card. At that time I explaiend to Ms. Maas
all the evidence I had acquired up to that time. At
that time I advised Karen of her rights, read her a
waiver, asked her if she wanted to talk to me. She
responded, Why, you have everything anyway? No, I
don't want to talk to you.
Q. After she said that did you question her any
further?
A. No, I left.
Tr. at pp. 4 7-48.
The sole purpose of putting this testimony into evidence was
to harm Ms. Maas' credibility in front of the jury. The jury
heard this same officer testify twice as the jury was permitted
during deliberation to review the officer's videotaped testimony
in it's entirety. (Tr. at p. 77; 115) Additionally, the
prosecution used her silence in his closing to call her a liar
and to point out to the jury that she took her time in making up
her "story."

He stated such as follows:

. . .1 want you to go into the jury room and deliberate
and I want you to come back out and say that we don't
know what fraudulent credit card purchasers look like
either, but in this case they look like defendant, and
Karen Maas you can't lie your way out of this, we find
you guilty.
Tr. at p. 111-112.
Further, the prosecution did not accidentally elicit the

-17-

officer's statement, but rather it came in after a side bar
which defense specifically tried to keep it out. (Tr. at p.
It appears that the trial Court noted the error in allowing
this testimony at this point in the proceedings:
THE COURT: Counsel, let's revisit the last motion. I
didn't realize that Mr. Neil had advised her of her
rights and asked her to waive those rights.
MR. SCHULTZ: Yes. That's the first thing I wanted to
ask the Court to do at this time is make a record or at
lease make sure we have on record the side bar motion.
I think there was a mischaracterization of the
testimony at side bar. The characterization from the
State was that she made some statements before he
advised Miranda, which was contrary to the testimony
that came in. He said he read her Miranda.
THE COURT: Mr. Benge didn't say anything about Miranda
warning coming before or after at any time. It was not
a circumstance where Miranda would be required unless
the defendant had been arrested and so I -MR. SCHULTZ: I think his comments were that she said
something before. That's where he says -MR. BENGE: I think I said, She said something before
she invoked her rights and what she said was what -THE COURT: Yes, and that's fine. What she said before
she invoked her rights was fine. But the invocation of
the rights itself is probably --is not fine, in my
opinion. So if I had known that she had been advised
of her rights, then having been advised of her rights
her statement, "No, I don't want to talk," is an
invocation of her rights which should not have been
disclosed to the jury. Her statement, "Why, you have
everything anyway," I do not think that is an
invocation of rights and I think that's relevant and
admissable.[sic] So had I known that all of that was
there I would have instructed the witness not to
testify that she said, No, I don't want to talk. But
he could still testify she said, Why, you have
everything anyway?
Tr. at pp. 49-50; emphasis

added.

Because the prosecution "uses" Ms. Maas' post-Miranda

-18-

silence against her at trial, a constitutional violation has
occurred.
Consequently, the burden now shifts to the State to show
that this error was not harmful.

In this case, the State will

not be able to do so. Analysis of the "Reyes"

factors enunciated

in Morrison illustrate that reversal is appropriate under all
four factors.
The first ".Reyes" factor asks us to consider whether the
jury would naturally and necessarily construe the comments as
referring to defendant's silence.

The answer here is yes.

prosecutor was specifically going after the defendant's
Miranda

silence

The

post-

when he entered into this line of questioning.

The defense tried to object during a side bar, but the Court
allowed the questioning nonetheless.6
6

The following bench conference took place prior to Officer
Neil's testimony:
MR. SHULTZ [attorney for defendant] : I'm going to make
an objection to any questions about whether or not he
attempted to interview Ms. Maas. Ms. Maas refused to
talk to him, she declined to talk to him, and I think
that would be an improper comment in exercising her
Fifth Amendment right now at this time. She didn't
exercise her Fifth Amendment right, but she did refuse
to talk to Deputy - MR. BENGE: Well, the comment she made before refusing
to comment is, I think, the way she - THE COURT: What did she say?
MR. BENGE: She said, Well, you have everything out, I
don't have anything else to say.
THE COURT: I think I'll let that in.
MR. SCHULTZ: We're on the record. My objection went
on the record?
THE COURT: Yes, I think so.
-19-

Clearly, there was no point to the prosecution's question
except to point out to the jury that Ms. Maas had not spoken to
the officer, suggesting that she had something to hide.

The only

motivation for this was to undermine her credibility and use her
silence as evidence to show that she was in fact guilty or hiding
something; suggesting to the jury that she remained silent only
have time to make up a story at a later date and tell it to the
jury at trial. (Tr. at pp. 111-112) As such, the State fails to
satisfy this first factor.
We next consider whether the tainted evidence was isolated.
It was not.

It came before the Court not once or twice, but

three times during a trial that lasted less than a day.

It came

in when Officer Neil first testified, then again during closing
and then again as the jury asked to view the video tape of
Officer Neil's testimony during deliberation.7 (Tr. at p. 48;
115) As such, this was not an isolated incident of error.

It

occurred three times--once before and twice after the defendant
testified as to her version of the events.

Two testimonial

references to her silence coupled with the prosecutor's argument

(Tr. at pp. 47)
7

Defense counsel failed to object to the prosecutor's
reference to Defendant's silence during closing and during the
viewing of the video, nonetheless, this failure is not fatal to
Defendant's appeal. In Morrison, no objection or request for a
curative instruction was made by defense, but since it was plain
error to fail to object, this Court still addressed this issue on
appeal and reversed the trial Court's decision. State v.
Morrison, 937 P.2d 1293 (Utah App. 1997).
-20-

that she was a liar (Tr. at p. 111-112) who would not talk to the
officer (Tr. at p. 48; 77) all occurred during the course of a
very short trial indicates that this evidence was harmful.
The next factor we consider is whether a curative
instruction was given.

It was not.

Although the Court offered

one after the first incident where Defendant's silence was put
before the jury, the defense declined. (Tr. at pp. 50-51)
Thereafter no curative instruction was offered or requested after
the prosecution used her silence against her in closing argument.
None was offered or asked for after the jury reviewed Officer
Neil's testimony about her silence.

Further, no jury instruction

was given to instruct the jury not to use her silence with the
officer against her. (Tr. at pp. 84-93; R081-098)

Here again,

the State cannot show that this error was not harmful.
Consequently, the sole factor which the State may rely on to
establish harmless error is whether the evidence of defendant's
guilt is overwhelming.
answer here is also no.
overwhelming.

As in Byrd, Morrison, and Velarde, the
The evidence against Ms. Maas was not

In fact, in opening argument, the State admitted

that the case against Ms. Maas was circumstantial.

The

prosecutor stated:
. . . This is what you're going to have. This is what
is called circumstantial evidence. We don't have a
witness that saw Ms. Maas take Mr. Prickett's card
number down, run it though. We don't have the witness
showing Ms. Maas taking this camping set out of the
store . . .
(Tr. at pp. 8)

-21-

The next question we ask is whether Ms. Maasf story was
plausible.

The answer is yes.

testified to her account.

She took the stand and she

(Tr. at pp. 66-82)

There is nothing

implausible about her explanation of how she came into possession
of that camp set.
The next consideration is whether the case depends primarily
on the resolution of conflicting evidence consisting of
uncorroborated and conflicting testimonies.
yes.

Again the answer is

The State's case depends upon whether you are persuaded by

purely circumstantial evidence, or whether you believe Ms. Maas
and her friend about how she came to possess the camping set.
The State argues that a theft by Ms. Maas is what most likely
happened, but Ms. Maas has an explanation, leaving the jury to
decide whether to believe her or the inference to be raised by
the circumstantial evidence and the argument of the State.
Again, the error was harmful as it casts doubt on her
truthfulness when all she had to rely on in her own defense was
her truthfulness.
Lastly, we consider the extent to which the defense rests on
the defendant's credibility.

As just stated, all she really had

to offer by way of defense was her own credibility, since the
State attacked her credibility by putting her post-Miranda
silence before the jury and calling her a liar, the error on the
part of the State caused harm.

Accordingly, it cannot be said

that it is beyond a reasonable doubt that this error was not
harmful and as such, reversal is constitutionally required.
-22-

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Defendant/Appellant respectfully
requests that this Court enter an order reversing the trial
Court's decision and remand the matter for a new trial.
DATED THIS 17th day of May, 1999.

Happy J^j Morgan
d
Attorney for Appellant
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Appellant's Brief by first-class postage pre-paid mail to the
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Mr. J. Frederic Voros, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
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937 P.2d 1293, State v. Morrison, (Utah App. 1997)
*1293 937 P.2d 1293
316 Utah Adv. Rep. 28
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Michael A. MORRISON, Defendant and Appellant.

110XX Trial
110XX(E) Arguments and Conduct of Counsel
110k705
Presentation of Evidence
110k706
For Prosecution
110k706(2)
Use of improper evidence;
perjured or false testimony.
[See headnote text below]

No. 960064-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
May 8, 1997.
Defendant was convicted in the Second District
Court, Ogden Department, Stanton Taylor, J., of
possession of controlled substance and possession of
dangerous weapon by restricted person. He appealed.
The Court of Appeals, Greenwood, J., held that
admission of testimony regarding defendant's decision
to remain silent following his arrest was prejudicial
error.
Reversed and remanded.
1. CRIMINAL LAW <S^ 1036.1(1)
110
110XXIV Review
HOXXIV(E) Presentation and Reservation in
Lower Court of Grounds of Review
110XXIV(E)1 In General
110kl036
Evidence
110kl036.1
In General
110kl036.1(l)
Objections to evidence in
general.
Utah App. 1997.
If counsel did not object to disputed testimony at
trial, defendant must convince appellate court that trial
court committed plain error by allowing allegedly
improper testimony.
2. CRIMINAL LAW <3^> 1030(1)
110
110XXIV Review
HOXXIV(E) Presentation and Reservation in
Lower Court of Grounds of Review
110XXIV(E)1 In General
110kl030
Necessity of Objections in General
110kl030(l)
In general.
Utah App. 1997.
To succeed on plain error claim, defendant must
demonstrate that error exists, that error should have
been obvious to trial court, and that error is harmful.
3. CRIMINAL LAW <@^>706(2)
110 —-

3. CRIMINAL LAW <@^> 1037.1(3)
110 —110XXIV Review
HOXXIV(E) Presentation and Reservation in
Lower Court of Grounds of Review
110XXIV(E)1 In General
110kl037
Arguments and Conduct of Counsel
110kl037.1
In General
110kl037.1(3)
Presentation of evidence.
Utah App. 1997.
It is plain error when prosecutor violates wellestablished general rule prohibiting him or her from
eliciting testimony of defendant's post-Miranda
silence. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.
4. CRIMINAL LAW <®^>706(2)
110 —
110XX Trial
110XX(E) Arguments and Conduct of Counsel
110k705
Presentation of Evidence
110k706
For Prosecution
110k706(2)
Use of improper evidence;
perjured or false testimony.
[See headnote text below]
4. CRIMINAL LAW <@^>1037.1(3)
110 —
110XXIV Review
HOXXIV(E) Presentation and Reservation in
Lower Court of Grounds of Review
110XXIV(E)1 In General
110kl037
Arguments and Conduct of Counsel
110kl037.1
In General
110kl037.1(3)
Presentation of evidence.
Utah App. 1997.
It was plain error for prosecutor to elicit testimony
from witnesses regarding defendant's decision to
remain silent following arrest.
U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 5.
5. CRIMINAL LAW <@^> 1163(3)
110 —
110XXIV Review
HOXXIV(Q) Harmless and Reversible Error
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1 lOkl 163 Presumption as to Effect of Error
1 lOkl 163(3) Rulings as to evidence.
Utah App. 1997.
To establish that defendant was not prejudiced by
admission of testimony regarding his decision to
remain silent following arrest, state bears burden of
demonstrating that improperly elicited testimony was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 5.
6. CRIMINAL LAW <&* 1162
110
110XXIV Review
110XXIV(Q) Harmless and Reversible Error
110kll62
Prejudice to rights of party as ground
of review.
Utah App. 1997.
In evaluating whether evidentiary error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, appellate court
focuses on whether there is a reasonable possibility
that evidence complained of might have contributed to
conviction. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.
7. CRIMINAL LAW <@=^> 1169.5(5)
110 —110XXIV Review
HOXXIV(Q) Harmless and Reversible Error
1 lOkl 169 Admission of Evidence
HOkl 169.5
Curing Error by Withdrawal,
Striking Out, or Instructions to Jury
I lOkl 169 5(5)
Admissions, declarations, and
hearsay; confessions.
[See headnote text below]
7. CRIMINAL LAW <@^> 1169.12
110 —
110XXIV Review
llOXXIV(Q) Harmless and Reversible Error
II Ok 1169 Admission of Evidence
11 Ok 1169.12 Acts, admissions, declarations, and
confessions of accused.
Utah App. 1997.
In determining whether defendant was prejudiced by
testimony regarding his decision to remain silent,
appellate court considers whether jury would naturally
and necessarily construe comment as referring to
defendant's silence, whether there was overwhelming
evidence of defendant's guilt, whether reference was
isolated, and whether trial court instructed jury not to
draw any adverse presumption from defendant's
decision not to testify. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.
8. CRIMINAL LAW <®^>407(1)

110
110XVII Evidence
HOXVII(L) Admissions
110k405
Admissions by Accused
110k407
Acquiescence or Silence
110k407(l)
In general.
[See headnote text below]
8. CRIMINAL LAW <@^> 1169.12
110
110XXIV Review
HOXXIV(Q) Harmless and Reversible Error
1 lOkl 169 Admission of Evidence
110kll69.12 Acts, admissions, declarations, and
confessions of accused.
Utah App. 1997.
Defendant was prejudiced by admission of testimony
regarding his postarrest silence; clear implication of
testimony was that defendant might have given
incriminating evidence but for witness' entreaty to
remain silent, there were two references to
defendant's in trial that lasted only one and one-half
days, trial court gave neither a curative instruction nor
a general instruction regarding right to remain silent
after arrest, and evidence of defendant's guilt was not
overwhelming. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.
9. CRIMINAL LAW <@^> 1165(1)
110 —
110XXIV Review
HOXXIV(Q) Harmless and Reversible Error
HOkl 165 Prejudice to Defendant in General
llOkl 165(1) In general.
Utah App. 1997.
In determining whether evidence was so
overwhelming as to overcome constitutional error,
appellate court examines both amount of evidence
indicating guilt as well as nature of state's case and of
defendant's defense.
10.CRIMINAL LAW <©=» 1165(1)
110
110XXIV Review
HOXXIV(Q) Harmless and Reversible Error
110k 1165 Prejudice to Defendant in General
llOkl 165(1) In general.
Utah App. 1997.
In determining whether evidence was so
overwhelming as to overcome constitutional error,
appellate court may consider whether state's case is
based on circumstantial rather than direct evidence,
plausibility of any exculpatory explanation for set of
circumstances leading to charges, whether case
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depends primarily on resolution of conflicting
evidence consisting of uncorroborated and conflicting
testimonies, and extent to which defense rested on
defendant's credibility.
*1294 Kent E. Snider, Public Defender Ass'n,
Ogden, for Defendant and Appellant.
Jan Graham, Atty. Gen. and Kenneth A. Bronston,
Asst. Atty. Gen., Criminal Appeals Div., Salt Lake
City, for Plaintiff and Appellee.
Before BILLINGS, GREENWOOD and JACKSON,
JJ.
OPINION
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Defendant
Michael
Morrison
appeals
his
convictions, after a jury trial, of possession of a
controlled substance, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1996), and
possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted
person, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (1995). Morrison claims,
among other things, that at trial, the prosecution
elicited prejudicial references to his post-arrest silence
during examination of two witnesses. We reverse
Morrison's convictions and remand for a new trial.

BACKGROUND (FN1)
On January 17, 1995, Layton City police officers
arrived at Morrison's home to execute *1295 an
arrest warrant unrelated to the facts of this case. At
the house, the officers first encountered Morrison's
mother, who directed them to Morrison's bedroom in
the basement. Upon entering the room, the officers
discovered Morrison in bed with Jill Crittenden and
observed Crittenden quickly reach over Morrison and
stash a syringe in a nearby dresser drawer. The
officers arrested Morrison and Crittenden and
administered Miranda warnings. See Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-73, 86 S.Ct. 1602,
1624-27, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
A subsequent search of the room uncovered drugs,
drug paraphernalia, and a loaded gun. The gun was
found in a dresser drawer along with a prescription
bottle with Morrison's name on it, a video rental card
with Morrison's name on it, a work order for
Morrison's car, and a letter addressed to Morrison.
In addition, the officers discovered that one of the

bullets in the gun had "K. Allen" written on it. The
name of Morrison's parole officer at the time was
Kim Allen.
Morrison was charged with, among other things,
possession of a controlled substance with intent to
distribute and possession of a dangerous weapon by a
restricted person. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8
(1996) (possession with intent to distribute), §
76-10-503 (1995) (possession of dangerous weapon by
restricted person). At trial, one of the arresting
officers, Detective Alan Swanson, testified that
Morrison had initially said there were no drugs in the
room that he knew of, and when asked about the
syringe Crittenden had hidden, Morrison said he did
not know it was there. Detective Swanson also
testified that when asked if there was a gun in the
room, Morrison initially answered no, but when asked
about bullets that were in plain view, he indicated that
there might be a gun in the room. According to
Officer Swanson, Morrison eventually said that there
may be a gun in his dresser drawer, the same dresser
drawer where Swanson found the gun loaded with the
"K. Allen" bullet. Also, Officer Swanson indicated
that Morrison admitted to him at that time that he and
Crittenden had used drugs the night before.
Another arresting officer, Officer Robert Price, also
testified.
During this testimony, the prosecution
elicited the following statements regarding the events
that occurred after Morrison's arrest and the officers
had administered the Miranda warnings:
The prosecutor:
Did you ever interview or
specifically interrogate [Morrison]?
Officer Price: I started talking to him very briefly
upstairs.
The prosecutor:
presence?

Was that in

[Crittenden's]

Officer Price: Yes, it was.
The prosecutor: And did he initially indicate a
willingness to talk to you?
Officer Price: I got the indication that he was
willing to talk to me.
The prosecutor: And did [Crittenden] do or say
something that stopped him?
Officer Price: She told him to shut up.
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The prosecutor: Did he do that?

Defense counsel did not object to this line of
questioning.

Officer Price: He did.
The prosecutor: Did she tell him once or more than
once?
Officer Price: It was twice that she told him to shut
up.
Defense counsel did not object to this line of
questioning.
Crittenden also testified, admitting her connection
with the January 17 episode and that she had been
convicted of possession and distribution of a
controlled substance in connection with the episode.
Crittenden testified that the controlled substances and
drug paraphernalia in the room were hers. She
testified that she had, at some point prior to the
January 17 episode, negotiated with an undercover
agent for the sale of a firearm which at the time she
said belonged to Morrison. (FN2)
She further
testified that the gun actually did not belong to
Morrison and that because she had been negotiating
for its sale, she took the gun from an upstairs room of
Morrison's house and put it in the drawer in
Morrison's room. She said she had received the
bullets that were in the gun from a friend and took
them to Morrison's house.
*1296 The prosecution also asked Crittenden about
telling Morrison to "shut up," resulting in the
following testimony:
The prosecutor: Okay. And, in fact, specifically
when the police officer from Layton was trying to
talk to [Morrison] at [Morrison's] home, you were
telling [Morrison] to shut up?
Crittenden: I had my lawyer on the phone. He told
me to~I was talking to [my lawyer] on the phone
while the police were there.
The prosecutor: So the answer is?
Crittenden: He advised me to be quiet and for
[Morrison] to do the same.
The prosecutor: So the answer is yes, you told
[Morrison] to shut up?
Crittenden: Yes, I did.

Morrison's stepfather also testified. He said that the
pistol was his and that he had left it on a shelf in an
upstairs bedroom of the house.
Morrison testified in his own defense. He claimed
the drugs and the drug paraphernalia were
Crittenden's. He also denied having directed Officer
Swanson to the gun or having admitted to Officer
Swanson that he and Crittenden had used drugs the
night before the arrest. Morrison testified that Allen
was his friend and that he did not write the name "K.
Allen" on the bullet.
ISSUE
We address the following dispositive issue: Did the
trial court commit plain error by not sua sponte
intervening when the prosecutor elicited testimony
that improperly referred to Morrison's choice to
remain silent after being arrested and after the
Miranda warnings had been administered?
ANALYSIS
[1] [2] Morrison claims that the prosecutor elicited
testimony which improperly alluded to his postMiranda silence. The State maintains that the alleged
testimony does not improperly allude to Morrison's
choice to remain silent, and that in any event, any
error was not prejudicial.
Because Morrison's
counsel did not object to the disputed testimony at
trial, he must now convince this court that the trial
court committed plain error by allowing the allegedly
improper testimony. See State v. Reyes, 861 P.2d
1055, 1057 (Utah.Ct.App. 1993). To succeed on a
plain error claim, Morrison must demonstrate that "(i)
[a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been
obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is
harmful." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah
1993).
[3] [4] It is error of a nature that should be obvious
to a trial court when the prosecutor violates the wellestablished general rule prohibiting him or her from
eliciting testimony of a defendant's post-Miranda
silence. See Reyes, 861 P.2d at 1057; see also Doyle
v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617-20, 96 S.Ct. 2240,
2244-45, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976); State v. Wiswell,
639 P.2d 146, 147 (Utah 1981). Thus, it was plain
error for the prosecutor in this case to elicit testimony
from both Crittenden and Officer Price regarding
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937 P.2d 532, State v. Byrd, (Utah App. 1997)
*532 937P.2d532
[See headnote text below]
315 Utah Adv. Rep. 17
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Ronnie C. BYRD, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 950399-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
April 24, 1997.
Following jury trial, defendant was convicted of
unlawful possession of controlled substance. The
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department, Division
I, Michael R. Murphy, J., denied defendant's motion
for new trial, and defendant appealed. The Court of
Appeals, Bench, J., held that: (1) prosecutor's
references to defendant's post-Miranda silence
violated due process, and (2) error was not harmless.
Reversed and remanded.
1. CRIMINAL LAW €==> 1134(4)
110
110XXIV Review
110XXIV(L) Scope of Review in General
110k 1134 Scope and Extent in General
1 lOkl 134(4) Rulings on motion for new trial.
Utah App. 1997.
Although Court of Appeals reviews trial court's
decision to deny motion for new trial under abuse of
discretion standard, any legal conclusions therein are
reviewed for correctness.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW <®^>268(8)
92
—
92X11 Due Process of Law
92k256 Criminal Prosecutions
92k268
Trial
92k268(2)
Particular Cases and Problems
92k268(8)
Qualifications, actions, and
comments of judge, jury, or prosecutor.

2. CRIMINAL LAW <2^706(4)
110 —
110XX Trial
110XX(E) Arguments and Conduct of Counsel
110k705
Presentation of Evidence
110k706
For Prosecution
110k706(4)
Cross-examination and
impeachment of accused.
Utah App. 1997.
Prosecutor's references to defendant's post-Miranda
silence, as substantive evidence in state's case-in-chief
and to impeach defendant, violated defendant's due
process rights. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
3. CRIMINAL LAW <@^>730(8)
110
110XX Trial
110XX(E) Arguments and Conduct of Counsel
110k730
Action of Court
110k730(8)
Comments on evidence or
witnesses.
[See headnote text below]
3. CRIMINAL LAW <@^> 1171.3
110 —110XXIV Review
110XXIV(Q) Harmless and Reversible Error
1 lOkl 171 Arguments and Conduct of Counsel
110kll71.3
Comments on evidence or
witnesses.
Utah App. 1997.
To determine whether state's improper use of
defendant's post-Miranda silence was harmless, Court
of Appeals considers whether jury would naturally
and necessarily construe comment as referring to
defendant's silence, whether there was overwhelming
evidence of defendant's guilt, whether reference was
isolated, and whether trial court instructed jury not to
draw any adverse presumption from defendant's
silence.

[See headnote text below]
2. CRIMINAL LAW <@^>706(2)
110 -—
110XX Trial
110XX(E) Arguments and Conduct of Counsel
110k705
Presentation of Evidence
110k706
For Prosecution
110k706(2)
Use of improper evidence;
perjured or false testimony.

4. CRIMINAL LAW €=^1171.3
110
110XXIV Review
HOXXIV(Q) Harmless and Reversible Error
1 lOkl 171 Arguments and Conduct of Counsel
1 lOkl 171.3
Comments on evidence or
witnesses.
Utah App. 1997.
Prosecutor's references to defendant's post-Miranda
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silence, in violation of due process, did not constitute
harmless error, as references were deliberate and
drew inferences of guilt, evidence was not
overwhelming but was conflicting and involved
credibility determinations, references occurred on
same day of one and one-half day trial and one
reference occurred shortly before jury retired to
deliberate, and trial court did not instruct jury not to
draw any adverse presumption from defendant's
silence. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
*533 Judith A. Jensen and Linda M. Jones, Salt
Lake City, for Defendant and Appellant.
Jan Graham and Thomas B. Brunker, Salt Lake
City, for Plaintiff and Appellee.
Before BENCH, BILLINGS and GREENWOOD,
JJ.
OPINION
BENCH, Judge:
Defendant Ronnie Byrd was convicted of two counts
of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a
third-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp.1996). He appeals the trial
court's order denying his motion for a new trial. We
reverse.
FACTS
On October 12, 1993, Officer Thomas Grant was
conducting surveillance of Pioneer Park for drugrelated activity. The officer had been watching the
north end of the park from the second story of a
nearby building.
Using a high-powered telescope, Officer Grant saw
a small car pull up to the curb at the north end of the
park. A man approached the front passenger side of
the car, spoke briefly with someone in the car, and
left. Another man, who appeared to be carrying a
"twist" containing drugs, then came up to the front
passenger side of the car. Officer Grant testified that
the man reached into the open window of the front
passenger door, handing the "twist" and then another
object to someone inside. It appeared to the officer
that the passenger in the front seat accepted both items
and handed some cash to the man. The car then
pulled away from the curb and left the area.
After the car had pulled away, Officer Grant called

Officers Martin Kaufman and David Thurgood, both
of whom had been assigned as "take-down" officers
for the drug surveillance operation. Officer Grant
described the car and said that the passenger in the
front seat had bought drugs at Pioneer Park. Officer
Kaufman and Officer Thurgood, who were driving in
separate cars, spotted the car, lost it for a few blocks,
and eventually stopped it several blocks from the
park.
After the stop, Officer Thurgood opened the front
passenger door of the car.
The officer asked
defendant, who was sitting in the front passenger seat,
to get out, and escorted him to the area immediately
behind the car. Officer Thurgood testified that he
arrested defendant, explained the Miranda (FN1)
rights to him, and asked him whether he understood
his rights. Defendant replied that he understood his
rights. The officer further testified that, when he
asked defendant if he would talk to him, defendant
responded affirmatively.
Officer Thurgood told
defendant that the police "had him on tape buying
drugs at Pioneer Park." Defendant did not, in any
way, respond to this statement. While another officer
stayed with defendant, Officer Thurgood searched
under the front passenger seat of the car, where he
found cocaine and heroin.
After defendant was arrested, Officer Thurgood and
defendant departed for the jail. The officer testified
that, as the police car pulled up to the jail, he asked
defendant, "[W]hat's up, what's going on?"
According to the officer, defendant replied that "he
just wanted to get high, and that he purchased *534
the drugs at Pioneer Park." Defendant denied having
ever made such a statement.
In a pretrial interview, Officer Kaufman, who had
approached the driver's side of the car after the stop,
told defense counsel that he did not search the car or
the other occupants of the vehicle.
On direct
examination at trial, however, he testified that, upon
obtaining consent from the driver, he searched the
entire car after Officer Thurgood had performed a
"cursory" search under the front passenger seat.
Officer Kaufman admitted on cross-examination that
before trial he had not told defense counsel that he
remembered having searched the car.
At trial, defendant admitted that he had been riding
in the front passenger seat of the car, but maintained
that the driver and backseat passenger had bought the
drugs at Pioneer Park. Defendant further denied that
he waived his Miranda rights or confessed to buying
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the drugs.
On direct examination of Officer
Thurgood, the prosecutor elicited testimony that
defendant had remained silent after receiving the
Miranda warning.
On cross-examination of
defendant, the prosecutor also referred to defendant's
post-Miranda silence to impeach defendant's
exculpatory testimony.
Defense counsel timely
objected to both references, but the trial court
declined to rule on the objections until some time after
trial. The jury found defendant guilty of the charges.
Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, arguing
that the State improperly used his silence at the time
of his arrest, both in its case-in-chief and to impeach
him on cross-examination. He also argued that the
State violated its duty to supplement discovery by
failing to inform defense counsel that, after the
pretrial interview, Officer Kaufman had recalled that
he did search the car. See State v. Knight, 734 P.2d
913, 917 (Utah 1987) (discussing prosecutor's
"continuing obligation to reveal newly discovered
evidence that fits within the scope of prior
disclosures").
[1] The State responded that because defendant
waived his Miranda rights, it could properly use his
failure to deny involvement in the drug transaction
when he was arrested. The State also argued that,
even if it had violated its discovery obligations by
failing to inform defense counsel about the change in
Officer Kaufman's testimony, the error was harmless.
The trial court denied the motion for a new trial,
concluding that any errors committed at trial were
harmless. Although we review the trial court's
decision to deny the motion for a new trial under an
abuse of discretion standard, see State v. Thomas, 830
P.2d 243, 245 (Utah 1992), any legal conclusions
therein are reviewed for correctness, see Hon ell v.
Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Co., 909 P.2d 1279,
1280 (Utah.Ct.App.), cert, denied, 920 P.2d 1194
(Utah 1996).
ANALYSIS
The United States Supreme Court has held that,
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the prosecution may not use a
defendant's posi-Miranda silence for impeachment
purposes. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619, 96
S.Ct. 2240, 2245, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976). Similarly,
the prosecution may not use a defendant's postMiranda silence as substantive evidence of guilt. See
United States v. Tenorio, 69 F.3d 1103, 1106 (11th
Cir.1995) (citing Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S.
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284, 295, 106 S.Ct. 634, 640-41, 88 L.Ed.2d 623
(1986)). The prosecution's use of post-Miranda
silence " 'prejudice^] the defendant by attempting to
create an inference of guilt in the jury's mind.' "
United States v. Newman, 943 F.2d 1155, 1157 (9th
Cir.1991) (quoting United States v. Wycoff, 545 F.2d
679, 681 (9th Cir.1976)); see also State v. Saunders,
98 Ohio App.3d 355, 648 N.E.2d 587, 590 (1994)
(noting effect of prosecutor's comment was to suggest
guilt of defendant, "because an innocent person would
not have remained silent").
[2] In the present case, the prosecutor referred to
defendant's post-Miranda silence on two occasions.
First, the prosecutor elicited the following testimony
from Officer Thurgood on direct examination:
Q [Prosecutor]: You asked the defendant to leave
[the car]. Then what happened?
A [Officer Thurgood]: I asked him to exit the
vehicle, come back towards me to the *535 rear
portion of this same vehicle. I then told this person
that he was under arrest, placed handcuffs on him.
Q: Then what did you do?
A: I advised this person, or the defendant, of his
rights. I went through the four steps that are
necessary, asked him if he would talk to me. He
agreed, which was a waiver of his rights. And then
proceeded to talk to the defendant.
Q: Then what happened?
A: Do you want me to go through the discussions?
Q: Yes.
A: Okay. I first off told the defendant that I had him
on tape buying drugs at Pioneer Park.
Q: What did the defendant say as to that?
A: He didn't say anything.
head.

He didn't move his

Later, on cross-examination of defendant, the
prosecutor used defendant's post-Miranda silence to
impeach his earlier exculpatory testimony:
Q [Prosecutor]: You talked to the officer after he
had advised you of your Miranda warnings, right?
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A [Defendant]: No, I didn't.
Q: Do you remember him giving you the Miranda
warnings?
A: I can't remember if he did or not.
Q: So it could have been or it could not have been;
that's what you are saying?
A: I just know ... I didn't talk to him.
Q: You certainly did not say anything to him about
the driver buying these drugs, did you?
A: I didn't say anything about no drugs, period.
Q: And certainly you didn't want to protect these
guys, did you?
A: Protect them from what?
The above excerpts from the trial transcript clearly
show that the prosecutor used defendant's silence both
as evidence of his guilt and to impeach his
exculpatory version of the events surrounding the
drug transaction. Because "virtually any description
of a defendant's silence following arrest and a
Miranda warning will constitute a Doyle violation,"
United States v. Shaw, 701 F.2d 367, 382 (5th
Cir. 1983), we conclude that the State violated
defendant's right to due process. See Doyle, 426 U.S.
at 619, 96 S.Ct. at 2245; Tenorio, 69 F.3d at 1106;
see also United States v. Baiter, 91 F.3d 427, 437-40
(3d Cir.) (assuming, but not holding, that Doyle was
violated where prosecutor commented on defendant's
silence following Miranda warning and subsequent
waiver of Miranda rights), cert, denied, — U.S. — ,
117 S.Ct. 517-18, 136 L.Ed.2d 406 (1996). (FN2)
[3] The State argues in the alternative, however, that
any violation of defendant's constitutional rights was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Brecht v.
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 630, 113 S.Ct. 1710,
1717, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (concluding Doyle
violations are trial errors subject to "harmless-beyonda-reasonable-doubt standard"). To determine whether
the State's improper use of defendant's silence was
harmless, we consider the following factors: "(1)
whether the jury would 'naturally and necessarily
construe' the comment as referring to defendant's
silence;
(2) whether there was overwhelming
evidence of defendant's guilt;
(3) whether the
reference was isolated; and (4) whether the trial court

instructed the jury not to draw any adverse
presumption from defendant's [silence]." State v.
Reyes, 861 P.2d 1055, 1057 (Utah.Ct.App. 1993)
(citation omitted).
[4] In State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769
(Utah.Ct.App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah
1991), this court refused to hold that the jury would
have naturally construed the prosecutor's statement as
referring to the defendant's post-Miranda silence. Id.
at 788.
Because the statement "was made while
commenting upon [the defendant's] trial account of the
moments surrounding the shooting," it did not
necessarily refer to the defendant's silence after his
arrest on the following day. Id.; see also Green v.
Roberts, *536 798 F.Supp. 649, 652 (D.Kan. 1992)
(concluding that, although prosecutor's comment
"could be construed" as reference to post-arrest
silence, "it is equally plausible that it was a fair
comment on petitioner's witnesses and evidence"),
aff'd, 13 F.3d 405 (10th Cir. 1993). Here, unlike in
Harrison, the officer's testimony and the prosecutor's
cross-examination of defendant clearly referred to
defendant's failure, following the Miranda warnings,
to deny involvement in the drug transaction. The
prosecutor's use of defendant's silence was not
passing, "but rather [was] deliberate and drew
inferences of guilt." Morris v. State, 112 Nev. 260,
913 P.2d 1264, 1268 (1996). We therefore conclude
that the jury could not have construed the improper
evidence as referring to anything but defendant's postMiranda silence.
We next consider whether the State offered
overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt. Courts
have concluded that undisputed direct evidence of the
defendant's guilt may constitute overwhelming
evidence. See, e.g., Passman v. Blackburn, 797 F.2d
1335, 1349 (5th Cir. 1986) (emphasizing three
witnesses "unequivocally" identified defendant as
perpetrator); Green, 798 F.Supp. at 652 (noting
several eyewitnesses saw defendant commit crime).
Courts have generally refused, however, to conclude
that evidence was overwhelming in cases that
ultimately rested on the jury's resolution of conflicting
evidence, particularly where the defendant's
credibility is involved. See Velarde v. Shulsen, 757
F.2d 1093, 1095 (10th Cir. 1985) (per curiam)
(emphasizing Doyle error not harmless in cases
resting primarily on circumstantial evidence and
uncorroborated and conflicting testimonies of
defendant and prosecution witnesses); White v. State,
647 N.E.2d 684, 688 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (finding
Doyle error not harmless where defendant's trial
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rant" of both the civil case and the grand
jury proceedings and was characterized by
the U.S. Supreme Court as having "no
knowledge whatsoever of the facts underlying either the criminal or civil proceedings
" Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. at 229, n.
18, 99 S.Ct. at 1678, n. 18. Rather, it
appears that this is a case where the criminal court "will be able intelligently, on the
basis of limited knowledge, to decide that
disclosure [in the civil case] is plainly inappropriate." Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. at 231,
99 S.Ct. at 1679. Thus, I do not believe
that the federal district court erred in refusing to hold an independent hearing to
determine the admissibility of the grand
jury materials.

al system." Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S.
90, 95-96, 101 S.Ct. 411, 415-416, 66
L.Ed.2d 308 (1980). I believe the decisions
of the Colorado trial court and Colorado
Court of Appeals, holding that the records
are grand jury materials entitled to secrecy, should be respected by the federal
courts.

As his final argument, the Attorney General claims that the federal district court
abused its discretion in dismissing the action. Under the circumstances, I find no
such abuse. The Attorney General was
granted several continuances to give him
the opportunity to convince the state court
that the secrecy order should be lifted.
The state district court, however, refused
to lift the order, and its ruling has recently
been upheld by the Colorado Court of Appeals. State v. Tynan, Slip Opinion (Colo.
App. November 8, 1984). The Attorney
General repeatedly advised the federal district court that he could not proceed to trial
unless he could make use of the records
subject to the secrecy order. The federal
proceeding cannot be continued ad infinitum on the chance that some day in the
distant future the secrecy order may be
lifted.

Fred VELARDE, Plaintiff-Appellant,

In closing, I reemphasize my belief that a
state court protective order is entitled to
the respect of the federal courts. State
court judgments are entitled to such "full
faith and credit in every court within the
United States . as they have by law and
usage in the courts of such state." 28
U S.C. § 1738. As stated by the U.S. Supreme Court, "[t]he federal courts
have
. . consistently accorded preclusive effect
to issues decided by state courts," noting
that such a practice "promote[s] the comity
between state and federal courts that has
been recognized as a bulwark of the feder-
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v.
Ken SHULSEN, Warden,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 84-2452.
United States Court of Appeals,
Tenth Circuit.
March 22, 1985.

Defendant who had been imprisoned
pursuant to state auto theft conviction filed
habeas corpus action. The United States
District Court for the District of Utah,
David K Winder, J., denied defendant's
application for writ, and defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals held that constitutional error arising from prosecution's
cross-examination of defendant concerning
his postarrest, post-Miranda silence was
not harmless, where prosecution's case was
entirely circumstantial, where only evidence linking defendant to auto theft with
which he was charged was testimony of
state's witness, who himself had admitted
driving vehicle in question, where trial was
short, and where prosecutor's comments
during closing argument emphasized postarrest silence.
Reversed
rections.

and

remanded

with di-
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1. Habeas Corpus «=>85.5(1)
Once there has been determination of
constitutional error with respect to prosecution's reference to defendant's postarrest
silence, it is government's burden to show
that comments made with regard to defendant's silence were harmless beyond
reasonable doubt. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend.
5.
2. Habeas Corpus <£=>30(1)
With regard to determination of
whether constitutional error was harmless,
fact that prosecution's case is entirely circumstantial weighs against conclusion of
harmless error.
3. Habeas Corpus <s=>45.3(1.30)
"Cause and prejudice" standard of
Wainwrigkt v. Sykes decision of United
States Supreme Court, rather than "plain
error" standard, applies in habeas proceeding attacking state conviction, when state
courts invoke state law to dismiss defendant's federal claims on procedural grounds
that defendant did not properly object.
4. Habeas Corpus e=*30(l)
Constitutional error arising from prosecution's cross-examination of defendant
concerning his postarrest, post-Miranda silence was not harmless, where prosecution's case was entirely circumstantial,
where only evidence linking defendant to
auto theft with which he was charged was
testimony of state's witness, who himself
had admitted driving vehicle in question,
where trial was short, and where prosecutor's comments during closing argument
emphasized postarrest silence. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 5.

Fred Velarde, pro se.
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., and J.
Stephen Mikita, Asst. Atty. Gen., the State
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, for defendant-appellee.
* The Honorable John P. Moore, United States
District Judge for the District of Colorado, sit-

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, LOGAN, Circuit Judge, and MOORE, District
Judge.*
PER CURIAM.
This three-judge panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not
be of material assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a);
10th Cir.R. 10(e). The cause is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
This is an appeal from an order of the
district court denying petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus brought
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Petitioner, currently incarcerated at the
Utah State Prison, brought this action for a
writ of habeas corpus in the United States
District Court for the District of Utah.
Petitioner asserted that in November of
1982, he had been convicted, after trial by
jury in the district court of Morgan County,
Utah, of the second-degree felony of auto
theft and sentenced to a one—to fifteenyear term of imprisonment. Petitioner's
conviction was affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court on January 9, 1984, whereupon petitioner filed this habeas corpus action. Petitioner has exhausted available
state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b).
The sole issue presented to the federal
district court in the habeas petition (as well
as to the Utah Supreme Court on direct
appeal) was whether the trial court erred in
permitting the prosecutor to cross-examine
petitioner regarding his post-arrest, post"Miranda warning" silence, and in permitting the prosecutor to make reference to
petitioner's silence in his closing statement,
in violation of petitioner's Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process. (Relevant portions of the trial transcript are
reproduced in the appendix following this
opinion.) After consideration of the trial
transcript, the opinion of the Utah Supreme
Court, and the arguments submitted by the
parties, the federal magistrate concluded
that the prosecutor's questions could be
ting by designation.
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divided into two categories, Certain questions were directed towards showing that
what petitioner told Officer Nelson was
inconsistent with petitioner's testimony on
the stand. Instead of admitting the inconsistency, petitioner denied making a statement and claimed he invoked his right to
silence. However, petitioner's testimony
was refuted by Officer Nelson's testimony.
The Utah Supreme Court resolved this factual question of whether petitioner had
made a statement to Officer Nelson or said
nothing in favor of the prosecution. This
factual determination the magistrate found
to be supported by the record and entitled
to a presumption of correctness (Vol. I at
61).
The magistrate found that the prosecutor
also engaged in a second type of questioning which was designed to call attention to
the fact that petitioner had not made any
exculpatory statements at the time of the
arrest. This examination the magistrate
found was in effect an inquiry into petitioner's silence at the time of his arrest. The
magistrate determined that these questions
were not related to prior inconsistent statements as allowed by Anderson v. Charles,
447 U.S. 404, 100 S.Ct 2180, 65 L.Ed.2d 222
(1980), but were of the type specifically
prohibited under the Supreme Court's decision of Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96
S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976). Consequently, the magistrate concluded, and the
district court agreed, that this portion of
the prosecutor's examination was constitutional error.
The magistrate then concluded that this
error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt under Chapman v. California, 386
U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967).
The Attorney General's brief before us
agrees that there was constitutional error
in the latter portion of the questioning,
arguing only that the error was harmless.
[1] We conclude that there was constitutional error in at least part of the questioning and in the argument. Doyle v.
Ohio, supra; Johnson v. Patterson, 475
F.2d 1066, 1067 (10th Cir.), cert denied,
414 U.S. 878, 94 S.Ct. 64, 38 L.Ed.2d 124

(1973). The issue then is whether the prosecutor's questions and remarks constituted
harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87
S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). Once
there has been a determination of constitutional error, it is the government's burden
to show that comments made with regard
to a defendant's silence were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v.
Barton, 731 F.2d 669, 675 (10th Cir.1984).
In this case the state did not argue the
question of harmless error in the federal
district court, but it does now in the recent
appellee's memorandum brief at page 3.
This court has held that where the case
comes down to a one-on-one situation, i.e.,
the word of the defendant against the word
of the key prosecution witness, and there is
no corroboration on either side, the importance of the defendant's credibility becomes so significant that prosecutorial error attacking that credibility cannot be
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
United States v. Polsinelli, 649 F.2d 793,
798 (10th Cir. 1981). Similarly, this court
ruled in United States v. Johnson, 495
F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1974), that where the
very essence of a case is the jury's evaluation of defendant's credibility, the admission of tainted evidence cannot be considered harmless. Id. at 246 n. 5.
[2-4] In this case, the prosecution's
case was entirely circumstantial, a factor
which weighs against a conclusion of harmless error. See Keen v. Detroit Diesel
Allison, 569 F.2d 547, 556 (10th Cir. 1978)
(McKay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The only evidence linking
petitioner to the theft of the truck was that
of the state's witness, who had admitted
driving the truck and who, petitioner
claimed, had been the driver of the truck at
the time he gave petitioner a ride. Petitioner's version of the events is not so
implausible that it can be said that the jury
was unaffected by the prosecutor's comments on his post-arrest silence. There
was no corroborating evidence to support
either version of the story. United States
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1558, 1575 n. 44, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982).
We therefore hold that there was constitutional error in the repeated questions by
the prosecuting attorney and the closing
argument which violated petitioner's due
process right to remain silent, contrary to
the holding of Doyle v. Ohio, supra, and
other authorities.1

v. Polsinelli, 649 F.2d at 798; United
States v. Johnson, 495 F.2d at 246 n. 5.
The transcript reveals that the presentation of both the state's and petitioner's
evidence lasted only one morning. Consequently, the prosecutor's inquiries regarding petitioner's failure to give his version
of the story at the time of arrest in the
context of this short trial take on greater
significance. See United States v. Bridwell, 583 F.2d 1135, 1139 (10th Cir.1978).
Moreover, the trial court judge did not give
a curative instruction and, to the contrary,
overruled defense counsel's objections.
United States v. Barton, 731 F.2d 669, 675
(10th Cir.1984). Unlike Bridwell, the evidence here is less than overwhelming.
Finally, the prosecutor's intent to call
attention to petitioner's silence at the time
of his arrest is further demonstrated by his
comments during closing argument, which,
contrary to the magistrate's conclusions, do
emphasize petitioner's post-arrest silence.
There had been repeated objections to the
constitutional error in the questioning (Vol.
II at 147, 149, 150), which were overruled.
The absence of a further objection to the
argument itself does not preclude consideration of the constitutional error in the argument because the Utah Supreme Court
considered petitioner's contention on this
issue on the merits and there was no finding of a procedural default by petitioner in
the state court trial. Ulster County Court
v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 154, 99 S.Ct. 2213,
2223, 60 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979); see Engle v.
Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135 n. 44, 102 S.Ct.

During the course of the prosecution's
cross-examination of petitioner, the prosecutor asked petitioner the following questions:
Q. Mr. Velarde, on that evening, why
didn't you tell Officer Nelson your
side of the story? [defense counsel's objection is overruled]
A. 'cause [sic] he read me my Miranda
rights, and I felt that I didn't have
to answer him any questions that

1. In so holding, we are mindful of the recent
Supreme Court decision in United States v.
Young, — US. — , 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L Ed.2d
1 (1985). There the Court held that a prosecutor's improper remarks in closing argument
pertaining to his personal belief of defendant's
guilt did not constitute "plain error" undermining the fundamental fairness of the trial, on
consideration of the entire record The Court
there applied the "plain error" standard because
the case involved a direct appeal asserting errors not objected to at trial.
However, the "plain error" standard does not
apply and instead the "cause and prejudice"
standard of Wainwnght v. Sykes, 433 U S. 72, 97
S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed 2d 594 (1977), applies in a
habeas proceeding attacking a state conviction,
when the state courts invoke state law to dis-

miss a defendant's federal claims on procedural
grounds that the defendant did not properly
object. See Hux v. Murphy, 733 F.2d 737, 739
(10th Cir.1984), c/. United States v. Frady, 456
U.S 152, 164-66, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 1592-93, 71
L.Ed 2d 816 (1982); see also Henderson v. Kibbe,
431 U.S. 145, 154, 97 S.Ct. 1730, 1736, 52
L Ed 2d 203 (1977). Nevertheless, we need not
reach the "cause and prejudice" test here because the state court considered the constitutionality of the closing argument on the merits
and made no finding of procedural default.
Hux v. Murphy, 733 F 2d at 738-39, Monshita v.
Moms, 702 F 2d 207, 209 (10th Cir.1983); Corn
v. Zant, 708 F 2d 549, 555 n. 2 (11th Cir.1983),
cert, denied, — U.S.
, 104 S.Ct. 2670, 81
L.Ed.2d 375 (1984).

We also note that a certificate of probable cause was not issued in the district
court. However, in the interest of justice,
we will construe petitioner's notice of appeal as such a request, pursuant to Fed.R.
App.P. 22(b), and hereby issue a certificate
of probable cause.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Utah is REVERSED. The cause is REMANDED with
directions that it be held in abeyance for
sixty days to permit the state to re-try the
petitioner; if such retrial does not occur,
then the writ shall issue.
Appendix
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Appendix—Continued
would put my, that would be used
against me in a court of law.
Q. Mr. Velarde, haven't you repeatedly
told Mr. Nelson after the Miranda
Warning, I think, that you couldn't
remember anything?
A. Well, that's just like not talkin' to
him.
Q. Now but, Mr. Velarde, have you repeatedly told Mr. Nelson upon direct
questioning from him did you not,
that you didn't want to talk because
of your legal rights, but simply you
couldn't remember anything?
(Vol. II at 146-147).
Q. And is it your position, Mr. Velarde,
that, do I understand your testimony
correctly, is that you chose not to
tell Mr. Nelson anything because
you don't trust police officers?
A. That's correct.
Q. So you have elected to go forward
with this entire criminal prosecution,
be arrested for vehicle theft, and
wait until today for the first time to
give your version of what happened?
[defense counsel's objection is overruled by the court]
(Vol. II at 149).
Q

Mr. Velarde, this is the first time
that you have elected to state your
version of what occurred in Salt
Lake County and in Morgan County,
is that true?

A. Well yea, it's the first time I have
said anything about the case. This
is—
Q. And that, and notwithstanding that
this offense occurred in excess of six
weeks ago?
A. What do you mean by that?

Q. For six weeks you have chosen to
remain silent and to utilize just today to say—
A. I have talked to my attorney.
(Vol. II at 151).
During the course of closing arguments
the prosecutor stated:
Why does Mr. Velarde remember now
but he didn't remember then?
Why
does Mr. Pentz in effect put himself back
into the boiling water by calling the Sheriff's Office, telling him where to go and
then unlike Mr. Velarde, relate to the
officer what happened?
And why
does Mr. Velarde wait six weeks? Why
not at the accident scene say, I'm innocent?
(Vol. II at 159) (emphasis added).
Later, during his rebuttal the prosecutor
said:
but human nature is not such that Mr.
Pentz would put everything on the line to
put himself back into a crime with no
expectations that Mr. Velarde in a sense
of outrage, in a sense of absolute pure
indignation will say hey, wait a minute,
let's get this story straight. He picked
me up in Salt Lake. I passed out. He
drqye me here. I didn't ever have that
truck. But instead he said
(Vol. II at 165).
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DOYLE v. OHIO
CERTIORARI TO T H E COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO,
TUSCARAWAS COUNTY

No. 75-5014.

Argued February 23, 1976—Decided June 17, 1976*

During the course of their state criminal trials petitioners, who after
arrest were given warnings in line with Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U. S. 436, 467-473, took the stand and gave an exculpatory
story that they had not previously told to the police or the
prosecutor. Over their counsel's objection, they were crossexamined as to why they had not given the arresting officer
the exculpatory explanations. Petitioners were convicted, and,
their convictions were upheld on appeal. Held: The use for
impeachment purposes of petitioners' silence, at the time of arrest and after they received Miranda warnings, violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Post-arrest silence
following such warnings is insolubly ambiguous; moreover, it
would be fundamentally unfair to allow an arrestee's silence to be
used to impeach an explanation subsequently given at trial after
he had been impliedly assured, by the Miranda warnings, that silence would carry no penalty. Pp. 616-620.
Reversed and remanded.
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER,
C. J., and BRENNAN, STEWART, W H I T E , and MARSHALL, J J , joined.

STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BLACKMUN and
REHNQUIST, JJ., joined, post, p. 620.

James R. Willis argued the cause for petitioners and
filed briefs in both cases.
Ro?mld L. Collins argued the cause pro hac vice and
filed a brief for respondent in both cases.t
^Together with No. 75-5015, Wood v. Ohio, also on certiorari to
the same court.
•[Solicitor General Bork filed a brief for the United States as
amicus curiae.
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delivered the opinion of the

Court.
The question in these consolidated cases is whether a
state prosecutor may seek to impeach a defendant's exculpatory story, told for the first time at trial, by crossexamining the defendant about his failure to have told
the story after receiving Miranda warnings 1 at the time
of his arrest. We conclude that use of the defendant's
post-arrest silence in this manner violates due process,
and therefore reverse the convictions of both petitioners.
I
Petitioners Doyle and Wood were arrested together
and charged with selling 10 pounds of marihuana to a
local narcotics bureau informant. They were convicted
in the Common Pleas Court of Tuscarawas County, Ohio,
in separate trials held about one week apart. The evidence at their trials was identical in all material respects.
The State's witnesses sketched a picture of a routine
marihuana transaction. William Bonnell, a well-known
"street person" with a long criminal record, offered to
assist the local narcotics investigation unit in setting
up drug "pushers" in return for support in his efforts
to receive lenient treatment in his latest legal problems. The narcotics agents agreed. A short time later,
Bonnell advised the unit that he had arranged a "buy"
of 10 pounds of marihuana and needed $1,750 to pay
for it. Since the banks were closed and time was short,
the agents were able to collect only $1,320. Bonnell
took this money and left for the rendezvous, under surveillance by four narcotics agents in two cars. As
planned, he met petitioners in a bar in Dover, Ohio.
From there, he and petitioner Wood drove in BonnelPs
1

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 467-473 (1966).
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pickup truck to the nearby town of New Philadelphia,
Ohio, while petitioner Doyle drove off to obtain the
marihuana and then meet them at a prearranged location
in New Philadelphia. The narcotics agents followed the
Bonnell truck. When Doyle arrived at Bonneirs waiting truck in New Philadelphia, the two vehicles proceeded to a parking lot where the transaction took
place. Bonnell left in his truck, and Doyle and Wood
departed in Doyle's car. They quickly discovered that
they had been paid $430 less than the agreedupon price, and began circling the neighborhood looking for Bonnell. They were stopped within minutes
by New Philadelphia police acting on radioed instructions from the narcotics agents. One of those agents,
Kenneth Beamer, arrived on the scene promptly, arrested
petitioners, and gave them Miranda warnings. A search
of the car, authorized by warrant, uncovered the SI,320.
At both trials, defense counsel's cross-examination of
the participating narcotics agents was aimed primarily
at establishing that, due to a limited view of the parking lot, none of them had seen the actual transaction
but had seen only Bonnell standing next to Doyle's
car with a package under his arm, presumably after
the transaction. 2 Each petitioner took the stand at
his trial and admitted practically everything about the
State's case except the most crucial point: who was
2

Defense counsel's efforts were not totally successful. One of
the four narcotics agents testified at both trials that lu1 had seen
the package passed through the window of Doyle's car to Bonnell.
In an effort to impeach that testimony, defense counsel played a
tape of the preliminary hearing at which the same ag^nt had testified only to seeing the package under Bonneirs arm. The agent
did not retract his trial testimony, and both he and the prosecutor
explained the apparent inconsistency by noting that the examination
at the preliminary hearing had not focused upon whether anyone
had seen the package pass to Bonnell.
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selling marihuana to whom. According to petitioners,
Bonnell had framed them. The arrangement had been
for Bonnell to sell Doyle 10 pounds of marihuana.
Doyle had left the Dover bar for the purpose of borrowing the necessary money, but while driving by himself
had decided that he only wanted one or two pounds
instead of the agreed-upon 10 pounds. When Bonnell
reached Doyle's car in the New Philadelphia parking lot,
with the marihuana under his arm, Doyle tried to explain his change of mind. Bonnell grew angry, threw
the $1,320 into Doyle's car, and took all 10 pounds of
the marihuana back to his truck. The ensuing chase was
the effort of Wood and Doyle to catch Bonnell to find
out what the $1,320 was all about.
Petitioners' explanation of the events presented some
difficulty for the prosecution, as it was not entirely implausible and there was little if any direct evidence to
contradict it.3 As part of a wide-ranging cross-examination for impeachment purposes, and in an effort to undercut the explanation, the prosecutor asked each petitioner
at his respective trial why he had not told the frameup
story to Agent Beamer when he arrested petitioners. In
the first trial, that of petitioner Wood, the following
colloquy occurred: 4
"Q. [By the prosecutor.] Mr. Beamer did arrive
on the scene?
"A. [By Wood.] Yes, he did.
"Q. And I assume you told him all about what
happened to you?
"A. No.
3

See n. 2, supra.
Trial transcript in Ohio v. Wood, No. 10057, Common Pleas
Court, Tuscarawas County, Ohio (hereafter Wood Tr.), 465-470.
1
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"Q. You didn't tell Mr. Beamer?
"A. No.
"Q. You didn't tell Mr. Beamer this guy put
$1,300 in your car?
•
•
•
•
•
"A. No, sir.
"Q. And we can't understand any reason why anyone would put money in your car and you were chasing him around town and trying to give it back?
"A. I didn't understand that.
"Q. You mean you didn't tell him that?
"A. Tell him what?
"Q. Mr. Wood, if that is all you had to do with
this and you are innocent, when Mr. Beamer arrived
on the scene why didn't you tell him?
"Q. But in any event you didn't bother to tell
Mr. Beamer anything about this?
"A. No, sir."
Defense counsel's timely objections to the above questions of the prosecutor were overruled. The cross-examination of petitioner Doyle at his trial contained a
similar exchange, and again defense counsel's timely
objections were overruled.6
5

Trial transcript in Ohio v. Doyle, No. 10656, Common Pleas
Court, Tuscarawas County, Ohio (hereafter Doyle Tr.), 504-507:
"Q. [By the prosecutor.] . . . You are innocent?
"A. [By Doyle.] I am innocent. Yes Sir.
"Q. That's why you told the police department and Kenneth
Beamer when they arrived—
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Each petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals,
Fifth District, Tuscarawas County, alleging, inter alia,
that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to
cross-examine the petitioner at his trial about his postarrest silence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, stating as to the contentions about the postarrest silence:
"This was not evidence offered by the state in its
case in chief as confession by silence or as substantive evidence of guilt but rather cross examination
"(Continuing.)—about your innocence?
"A.
"Q.

. . . I didn't tell them about my innocence. No.
You said nothing at all about how you had been set up?

"Q. Did Mr. Wood?
"A. Not that I recall, Sir.
"Q. As a matter of fact, if I recall your testimony correctly, you
said instead of protesting your innocence, as you do today, you said
in response to a question of Mr. Beamer,—'I don't know what you
are talking about.'
"A. I believe what I said,—'What's this all about?' If I remember, that's the only thing I said.
"A. I was questioning, you know, what it was about. That's
what I didn't know. I knew that I was trying to buy, which was
wrong, but I didn't know what was going on. I didn't know that
Bill Bonnell was trying to frame me, or what-have-you.
"Q. All right,—But you didn't protest your innocence at that
time?
"A. Not until I knew what was going on."
In addition, the court in both trials permitted the prosecutor,
over more objections, to argue petitioners' post-arrest silence to the
jury. Closing Argument of Prosecutor 13-14, supplementing Wood
Tr.; Doyle Tr. 515, 526.
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of a witness as to why he had not told the same
story earlier at his first opportunity.
"We find no error in this. I t goes to credibility
of the witness."
The Supreme Court of Ohio denied further review.
We granted certiorari to decide whether impeachment
use of a defendant's post-arrest silence violates any provision of the Constitution/ a question left open last Term
in United States v. Hale, 422 U. S. 171 (1975), and on
which the Federal Courts of Appeals are in conflict. See
id., at 173 n. 2.
II
The State pleads necessity as justification for the
prosecutor's action in these cases. It argues that the
discrepancy between an exculpatory story at trial and
silence at time of arrest gives rise to an inference that
the story was fabricated somewhere along the way, perhaps to fit within the seams of the State's case as it was
developed at pretrial hearings. Noting that the prosecution usually has little else with which to counter such
an exculpatory story, the State seeks only the right to
cross-examine a defendant as to post-arrest silence for
the limited purpose of impeachment. In support of its
position the State emphasizes the importance of cross6

Petitioners also claim constitutional error because each of them
was cross-examined by the prosecutor as to why he had not told
the exculpatory story at the preliminary hearing or any other time
prior to the trials. In addition, error of constitutional dimension is
asserted because each petitioner was cross-examined as to post-arrest,
preliminary hearing, and general pretrial silence when he testified as a
defense witness at the other petitioner's trial. These averments of
error present different considerations from those implicated by crossexamining petitioners as defendants as to their silence after receiving Miranda warnings at the time of arrest. In view of our disposition of this case we find it unnecessary to reach these additional
issues.
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examination in general, see Brown v. United States, 356
U. S. 148, 154-155 (1958), and relies upon those cases
in which this Court has permitted use for impeachment
purposes of post-arrest statements that were inadmissible
as evidence of guilt because of an officer's failure to
follow Miranda's dictates. Harris v. New York, 401
U. S. 222 (1971); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U. S. 714 (1975) ;
see also Walder v. United States, 347 U. S. 62 (1954).
Thus, although the State does not suggest petitioners'
silence could be used as evidence of guilt, it contends
that the need to present to the jury all information
relevant to the truth of petitioners' exculpatory story
fully justifies the cross-examination that is at issue.
Despite the importance of cross-examination,7 we have
concluded that the Miranda decision compels rejection
of the State's position. The warnings mandated by that
case, as a prophylactic means of safeguarding Fifth
Amendment rights, see Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S.
433, 443-444 (1974), require that a person taken into
custody be advised immediately that he has the right
to remain silent, that anything he says may be used
against him, and that he has a right to retained or
appointed counsel before submitting to interrogation.
Silence in the wake of these warnings may be nothing more than the arrestee's exercise of these Miranda
rights. Thus, every post-arrest silence is insolubly ambiguous because of what the State is required to advise
the person arrested.8 See United States v. Hale, supra,
7

We recognize, of course, that unless prosecutors are allowed wide
leeway in the scope of impeachment cross-examination some defendants would be able to frustrate the truth-seeking function of a trial
by presenting tailored defenses insulated from effective challenge.
See generally Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U. S. 304, 315 (1900).
8
The dissent by M R . JUSTICE STEVENS expresses the view that
the giving of Miranda warnings does not lessen the "probative
value of [a defendant's] silence . . . ." Post, at 621. But in United
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at 177. Moreover, while it is true that the Miranda
warnings contain no express assurance that silence will
carry no penalty, such assurance is implicit to any person
who receives the warnings. In such circumstances, it
would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due
process to allow the arrested person's silence to be used
to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial. 0
States v. Hale, 422 U. S. 171, 177 (1975), we noted that silence at
the time of arrest may be inherently ambiguous even apart from the
effect of Miranda warnings, for in a given case there may be several
explanations for the silence that are consistent with the existence
of an exculpatory explanation. In Hale we exercised our supervisory powers over federal courts. The instant cases, unlike Hale,
come to us from a state court and thus provide no occasion for
the exercise of our supervisory powers. Nor is it necessary, in view
of our holding above, to express an opinion on the probative value
for impeachment purposes of petitioners' silence. We note only that
the Hale court considered silence at the time of arrest likely to be
ambiguous and thus of dubious probative value.
9
A somewhat analogous situation was presented in Johnson v.
United States, 318 U. S. 189 (1943). A defendant who testified
at his trial was permitted by the trial judge to invoke the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in response to certain questions on cross-examination. This Court assumed that it
would not have been error for the trial court to have denied the
privilege in the circumstances, see id., at 196, in which case a failure
to answer would have been a proper basis for adverse inferences
and a proper subject for prosecutorial comment. But because the
privilege had been granted, even if erroneously, "the requirements
of fair trial" made it error for the trial court to permit comment
upon the defendant's silence. Ibid.
"An accused having the assurance of the court that his claim of
privilege would be granted might well be entrapped if his assertion
of the privilege could then be used against him. His real choice
might then be quite different from his apparent one. . . . Elementary fairness requires that an accused should not be misled on
that score." Id., at 197.
Johnson was decided under this Court's supervisory powers over
the federal courts. But the necessity for elementary fairness is not
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concurring in tbc judgment in
United States v. Hale, supra, at 182-183, put it very well:
"[W]hen a person under arrest is informed, as
Miranda requires, that he may remain silent, that
anything he says may be used against him, and that
he may have an attorney if he wishes, it seems to
me that it does not comport with due process to permit the prosecution during the trial to call attention
to his silence at the time of arrest and to insist that
because he did not speak about the facts of the case
at that time, as he was told he need not do, an
unfavorable inference might be drawn as to the
truth of his trial testimony. . . . Surely Hale was
not informed here that his silence, as well as his
words, could be used against him at trial. Indeed,
anyone would reasonably conclude from Miranda
warnings that this would not be the case." 10

M R . JUSTICE W H I T E ,

We hold that the use for impeachment purposes of
petitioners' silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings, violated the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 11 The State has not
unique to the federal criminal system. Cf. Raley v. Ohio, 360 U. S.
423, 437-440 (1959).
10
The dissenting opinion relies on the fact that petitioners
in this case, when cross-examined about their silence, did not offer
reliance on Miranda warnings as a justification. But the error we
perceive lies in the cross-examination on this question, thereby
implying an inconsistency that the jury might construe as evidence
of guilt. After an arrested person is formally advised by an officer
of the law that he has a right to remain silent, the unfairness
occurs when the prosecution, in the presence of the jury, is allowed
to undertake impeachment on the basis of what may be the exercise
of that right.
11
It goes almost without saying that the fact of post-arrest silence
could be used by the prosecution to contradict a defendant who
testifies to an exculpatory version of events and claims to have told
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claimed that such use in the circumstances of this case
might have been harmless error. Accordingly, petitioners' convictions are reversed and their causes remanded to the state courts for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom M R . JUSTICE BLACKMUN and M R . JUSTICE R E H N Q U I S T join, dissenting.

Petitioners assert that the prosecutor's cross-examination about their failure to mention the purported "frame"
until they testified at trial violated their constitutional
right to due process and also their constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. I am not persuaded by
the first argument; though there is merit in a portion of
the second, I do not believe it warrants reversal of these
state convictions.
The Court's due process rationale has some of the
characteristics of an estoppel theory. If (a) the defendant is advised that he may remain silent, and (b) he
does remain silent, then we (c) presume that his decision
was made in reliance on the advice, and (d) conclude
that it is unfair in certain cases, though not others, 1 to
use his silence to impeach his trial testimony. The key
to the Court's analysis is apparently a concern that the
Miranda warning, which is intended to increase the probthe police the same version upon arrest. In that situation the fact
of earlier silence would not be used to impeach the exculpatory
story, but rather to challenge the defendant's testimony as to his
behavior following arrest. Cf. United States v. Fair child, 505 F . 2d
1378, 1383 (CA5 1975).
1
As the Court acknowledges, the "fact of post-arrest silence could
be used by the prosecution to contradict a defendant who testifies
to an exculpatory version of events and claims to have told the
police the same version upon arrest." Ante, at G19 and this page,
n. 11.
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ability that a person's response to police questioning will
be intelligent and voluntary, will actually be deceptive
unless we require the State to honor an unstated promise
not to use the accused's silence against him.
In my judgment there is nothing deceptive or prejudicial to the defendant in the Miranda warning.2 Nor
do I believe that the fact that such advice was given to
the defendant lessens the probative value of his silence,
or makes the prosecutor's cross-examination about his
silence any more unfair than if he had received no such
warning.
This is a case in which the defendants' silence at the
time of their arrest was graphically inconsistent with
their trial testimony that they were the unwitting victims of a "frameup" in which the police did not participate. If defendants had been framed, their failure to
mention that fact at the time of their arrest is almost
2

At Wood's trial, the arresting officer described the warning
he gave petitioners:
"I told Mr Wood and Mr. Doyle of the Miranda warning rights—
they had the right to remain silent, anything they said could and
would be used against them in a court of law, and they had the
right to an attorney and didn't have to say anything without an
attorney being present and if they couldn't afford one, the court
would appoint them one at the proper time." Trial transcript in
Ohio v. Wood, No. 10657, Common Pleas Court, Tuscarawas
County, Ohio (hereafter Wood Tr.), 12G. At the Doyle trial, he
testified that he "gave them their rights" and gave them a " 'Miranda Warning.'" Trial transcript in Ohio v. Doyle, No. 10656,
Common Pleas Court, Tuscarawas County, Ohio (hereafter Doyle
Tr.), 269. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, requires the following
warning:
"[The suspect] must be warned prior to any questioning that he
has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used
against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence
of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will
be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires."
Id., at 479.
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inexplicable; for that reason, under accepted rules of
evidence, their silence is tantamount to a prior inconsistent statement and admissible for purposes of
impeachment. 3
Indeed, there is irony in the fact that the Miranda
warning provides the only plausible explanation for their
silence. If it were the true explanation, I should think
that they would have responded to the questions on
cross-examination about why they had remained silent
by stating that they relied on their understanding of the
advice given by the arresting officers. Instead, however,
they gave quite a different jumble of responses.4 Those
3

3 A J. Wigmore, Evidence §1042 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
Petitioner Doyle gave the following testimony on direct and
cross-examination at his trial:
"Q- [By defense counsel.] And you were placed under arrest at
that time?
"A. [By Doyle.] Yes. I asked what for and he said,—Tor the
sale of marijuana/ I told him,—I didn't know what he was talking about.
4

"Q- [By the prosecutor.] As a matter of fact, if I recall your
testimony correctly, you said instead of protesting your innocence,
as you do today, you said in response to a question of Mr.
Beamer,—'I don't know what you are talking about.'
"A. [By Doyle.] I believe what I said,—'What's this all about?'
If I remember, that's the only thing I said.
"Q. You testified on direct.
"A. If I did, then I didn't understand.
" . . . I was questioning, you know, what it was about. That's
what I didn't know. I knew that I was trying to buy, which was
wrong, but I didn't know what was going on. I didn't know that
Bill Bonnell was trying to frame me, or what-have-you.
"Q.
time?

All right,—But you didn't protest your innocence at that
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responses negate the Court's presumption that their
silence was induced by reliance on deceptive advice.
Since the record requires us to put to one side the
"A. Not until I knew what was going on." Doyle Tr. 479,
506-507.
At Wood's trial, Doyle gave a somewhat different explanation
of his silence at the time of arrest:
"Q. [By the prosecutor.] Why didn't [Wood] tell ["the police
officers] about Mr. Bonnell?
"A. [By Doyle.] Because we didn't know what was going on
and wanted to find out.
"Q. So he hid the money under the mat?
"A. The police officers said they stopped us for a red light. I
wanted to get my hands on Bill Bonnell.
"Q. It wasn't because you were guilty, was it?
"A. Because I wanted to get my hands on Bill Bonnell because
I suspected he was trying . . .
"Q. Why didn't you tell the police that Bill Bonnell just set
you up?
"A. Because I would rather have my own hands on him.
"Q. When Mr. Beamer arrived?
"A. . . . [W]hen Mr. Beamer got there I said to Mr. Beamer what
the hell is all this about and he said you are under arrest for the
suspicion of selling marijuana and I said you got to be crazy. I
was pretty upset.
"Q.
framed
"A.
"Q.
"A.

So on the night of April 29 you felt that you were being
like you are being framed today?
I was so confused that night, the night of the arrest.
How about Mr. Wood?
Mr. Wood didn't know what was going on.

"Q.
night?
"A.
"Q.
"A.
"Q.

. . . Are you as mad and upset today as you were that
I can't answer that question.
Did you feel the same way about what happened to you?
That night I felt like I couldn't believe what was happening.
You didn't like being framed?
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Court's presumption that the defendants' silence was the
product of reliance on the Miranda warning, the Court's
entire due process rationale collapses. For without re-

liance on the waiver, the case is no different than if no
warning had been given, and nothing in the Court's
opinion suggests that there would be any unfairness in

"A. That is right. I didn't like some one putting me in a spot
like that.
"Q. Didn't it occur to you to try to protect yourself?
"A. Yes, at this time I felt like I wasn't talking to nobody but
John James who was the attorney at that time.
"Q. But you felt . . .
"A. The man walked up and didn't ask me anything.
"Q. You didn't talk to a soul about how rotten it was because
you were framed?

"A. That is right. If I started I don't know where I would
have stopped. I was upset." Wood Tr. 424-430.
Petitioner Wood testified on cross-examination at his trial as
follows:

"A. I will answer the question, sir, the best I can. I didn't
know what to say. I was stunned about what was going on and I
was asked questions and I answered the questions as simply as I
could because I didn't have nobody there to help me answer the
questions.
"Q. Wouldn't that have been a marvelous time to protest your
innocence?
"A. I don't know if it would or not.
"Q. Do you remember having a conversation with Kenneth
Beamer?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. What was said?
"A. Kenneth Beamer said I want to know where you stash—
where your hide out is, where you are keeping the dope and I
said I don't know what you are talking about. I believe the
question was asked in front of you.
"Q. Where did this conversation take place?
"A. Took place during the search.
"Q. So any way you didn't tell anyone how angry you were that
night?
"A.
"Q.

I was very angry.
But you didn't tell anyone?

"Q. [By the prosecutor.] Jefferson Doyle said he was confused,
angry and upset [at the time of the arrest]. Were you confused,
angry and upset?
"A. [By Wood.] Upset and confused.
"Q. Why were you upset?
"A. Because I didn't know what was going on most of the time.
"Q. Why would you be upset? Because you found $1,300 in
your back seat?
"A. Mainly because the person that was in the car JefT [Doyle]
was upset confused and angry and . . .
"Q. What has that to do with you?
"A. I am in the car. That is what it has to do with me.
"Q. You are innocent?
"A. Yes.
"Q. Of anything?
"A. I don't know about anything.
"Q. This particular incident, you were placed under arrest,
weren't you?
"A. Yes, innocent of this incident.
"Q. Innocent of the entire transaction?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q.
"A.

Or even any knowledge of the entire transaction?
Up to a point, sir.

"Q. Mr. Wood, if that is all you had to do with this and you
are innocent, when Mr. Beamer arrived on the scene why didn't
you tell him?
"A. Mr. Cunningham, in the last eight months to a year there
has been so many implications, etc. in the paper and law enforcement that are setting people up and busting them for narcotics and
stuff." Wood Tr. 467-469.
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using petitioners' prior inconsistent silence for impeachment purposes in such a case.
Indeed, as a general proposition, if we assume the
defendant's silence would be admissible for impeachment purposes if no Miranda warning had been given,
I should think that the warning would have a tendency
to salvage the defendant's credibility as a witness. If
the defendant is a truthful witness, and if his silence
is the consequence of his understanding of the Miranda
warning, he may explain that fact when he is on the
stand. Even if he is untruthful, the availability of
that explanation puts him in a better position than if
he had received no warning. In my judgment, the risk
that a truthful defendant will be deceived by the Miranda warning and also will be unable to explain his
honest misunderstanding is so much less than the risk
that exclusion of the evidence will merely provide a
shield for perjury that I cannot accept the Court's due
process rationale.
Accordingly, if we assume that the use of a defendant's silence for impeachment purposes would be otherwise unobjectionable, I find no merit in the notion that
he is denied due process of law because he received a
Miranda warning.
II
Petitioners argue that the State violated their Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by asking the jury to draw an inference of guilt from their
constitutionally protected silence. They challenge both
the prosecutor's cross-examination and his closing
argument.
A
Petitioners claim that the cross-examination was improper because it referred to their silence at the time of
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their arrest, to their failure to testify at the preliminary
hearing, and to their failure to reveal the "frame" prior
to trial. Their claim applies to the testimony of
each defendant at his own trial, and also to the testimony each gave as a witness at the trial of the other.
Since I think it quite clear that a defendant may not
object to the violation of another person's privilege,5 I
shall only discuss the argument that a defendant may not
be cross-examined about his own prior inconsistent
silence.
In support of their objections to the cross-examination
about their silence at the time of arrest, petitioners primarily rely on the statement in Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U. S. 436, that the prosecution may not use at trial the
fact that the defendant stood mute or claimed the privilege in the face of accusations during custodial interrogation.6 There are two reasons why that statement does
not adequately support petitioners' argument.
First, it is not accurate to say that the petitioners
"stood mute or claimed the privilege in the face of accusations." Neither petitioner claimed the privilege and
5
See Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201, 206-207; 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence §2270, pp. 416-417 (McNaughton rev. 1961);
cf. Alderman v.JJnited States, 394 U. S. 165, 174. Cross-examination and comment upon a witness' prior silence does not raise any
inference prejudicial to the defendant, and indeed, does not even
raise any inference that the defendant remained silent.
G
"In accord with our decision today, it is impermissible to
penalize an individual for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege
when he is under police custodial interrogation The prosecution
may not, therefore, use at trial the fact that he stood mute or
claimed his privilege in the face of accusation. Cf. Griffin v. California, 380 U. S. 609 (1965); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1, 8
(1964); Comment, 31 U. Chi L. Rev. 556 (1964); Developments
in the Law—Confessions, 79 Ilarv. L. Rev. 935, 1041-1044 (1966).
See also Bram v. United States, 168 U. S. 532, 562 (1897)."
384 U. S., at 468 n. 37.
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petitioner Doyle did not even remain silent. The case
is not one in which a description of the actual conversation between the defendants and the police would give
rise to any inference of guilt if it were not so flagrantly
inconsistent with their trial testimony. Rather than a
claim of privilege, we simply have a failure to advise the
police of a "frame" at a time when it most surely would
have been mentioned if petitioners' trial testimony were
true. That failure gave rise to an inference of guilt only
because it belied their trial testimony.
Second, the dictum in the footnote in Miranda relies
primarily upon Griffin v. California, 380 IT. S. 609, which
held that the Fifth Amendment, as incorporated in the
Fourteenth, prohibited the prosecution's use of the defendant's silence in its case in chief. But as long ago as
Raff el v. United States, 271 U. S. 494, this Court recognized the distinction between the prosecution's affirmative use of the defendant's prior silence and the use of
prior silence for impeachment purposes. Raff el expressly
held that the defendant's silence at a prior trial was admissible for purposes of impeachment despite the application in federal prosecutions of the prohibition that
Griffin found in the Fifth Amendment. Raff el, supra, at
496-497.
Moreover, Mr. Chief Justice Warren, the author of the
Court's opinion in Miranda, joined the opinion in Walder v. United States, 347 U. S. 62, which squarely held
that a valid constitutional objection to the admissibility
of evidence as part of the Government's case in chief did
not bar the use of that evidence to impeach the defendant's trial testimony. The availability of an objection to
the affirmative use of improper evidence does not provide
the defendant "with a shield against contradiction of his
untruths." Id., at 65. The need to ensure the integrity
7

See n, 4, supra.

of the truth-determining function of the adversary trial
process lias provided the predicate for an unbroken line
of decisions so holding.8
8

As the Court recently recognized in a most carefully considered
opinion, an adversary system can maintain neither the reality nor
the appearance of efficacy without the assurance that its judgments
rest upon a complete illumination of a case rather than upon "a
partial or speculative presentation of the facts." United States v.
Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 709. The necessity of insuring a complete
presentation of all relevant evidence ha.s led to the rule that a
criminal defendant who voluntarily forgoes his privilege not to
testify, and presents exculpatory or mitigating evidence, thereby
subjects himself to relevant cross-examination without the right to
reclaim Fifth Amendment protection on a selective basis. Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U. S. 304, 315.
"If he takes the stand and testifies in his own defense, his credibility
may be impeached and his testimony assailed like that of any other
witness, and the breadth of his waiver is determined by the scope
of relevant cross-examination. '[7J]° has no right to set forth to
the jury all the facts which tend in his favor without laying himself
open to a cross-examination upon those facts.' " Brown v. United
States, 356 U. S. 148, 154-155 (citation omitted).
One need not impute perjury to an entiro class to acknowledge
that a testifying defendant has more to gain and less to lose than
an ordinary witness from fabrications upon the witness stand. Cf.
Reagan v. United States, 157 U. S. 301, 304-311; Taylor v. United
States, 390 F. 2d 278, 284-285 (CA8 1968) (Blackmun, J.).
As the Court notes today: "Unless prosecutors are allowed wide leeway in the scope of impeachment cross-examination some defendants
would be able to frustrate the truth-seeking function of a trial by
presenting tailored defenses insulated from effective challenge."
Ante, at 617 n. 7. In recognition of this fact, this Court has allowed
evidence to be used for impeachment purposes that would be inadmissible as evidence of guilt. In Walder v. United States, 347 U. S.
62, evidence of narcotics unlawfully seized in connection with an
aborted earlier case against a defendant was held admissible for the
limited purpose of impeaching the defendant's testimony that he
never had been associated with narcotics, although such evidence
clearly was inadmissible for any purpose in the prosecution's case in
chief. In Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222, the Court held admis-
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Although I have no doubt concerning the propriety
of the cross-examination about petitioners' failure to
mention the purported "frame" at the time of their arrest, a more difficult question is presented by their objection to the questioning about their failure to testify at
the preliminary hearing and their failure generally to
mention the "frame" before trial. 9 Unlike the failure
sible for the purpose of impeaching a defendant's testimony certain
partially inconsistent post-arrest statements which, although voluntary, were unavailable for the prosecution's case because they had
been given by the defendant without benefit of Miranda warnings.
And last Term, in a decision closely analogous to Harris, the Court
held admissible for impeachment purposes post-arrest statements of a
defendant made after he had received Miranda warnings and exercised his right to request a lawyer, but before he had been furnished
with counsel as Miranda requires in such circumstances. Oregon v.
Hass, 420 U. S. 714.
In each of these cases involving impeachment cross-examination,
the need to insure the integrity of the trial by the "traditional
truth-testing devices of the adversary process," Harris v. New York,
supra, at 225, was deemed to outweigh the policies underlying the
relevant exclusionary rules.
9
Petitioner Doyle was cross-examined as follows at his trial:
"Q. [By the prosecutor.] All right. Do you remember the
Preliminary Hearing in this case?
"A. [By Doyle.] Yes Sir. I remember it.
"Q. And that was prior to your indictment for this offense, was
it not?
"A. Yes sir. I believe,—Yes Sir, it was before I was indicted.
"Q. Arraignment. Is that what you mean?
"A. Yes. The next day after the arrest.
"Q. Yes, when evidence was presented and you had the opportunity to hear the testimony of the witnesses against you. Remember that?
"A. Yes Sir.
"Q. Mr. Bonnell testified; Captain Griffin testified; Deputy—
Chief Deputy White testified?
"A. Yes Sir.
"Q. Kenneth Beamer testified?
"A. Yes Sir.
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to make the kind of spontaneous comment that discovery
of a "frame" would be expected to prompt, there is no
significant inconsistency between petitioners' trial testi"Q.
"A.

You were there, weren't you?
Yes Sir.

"Q.
"A.
"Q.
"A.
"Q.

And your lawyer was there,—Mr. James?
Yes Sir.
Tape recording was made of the transcript?
Yes Sir.
Did you protest your innocence at that proceeding?

"A. I didn't—everything that was done with that was done with
my attorney. My attorney did it.
"Q. All right. The first time that you gave this version of
the fact was in the trial of Richard Wood,—was it not?
"A. Yes Sir. I t was the first time I was asked.
"Q. All the time, you being innocent?
"A. Yes Sir." Doyle Tr. 507-508.
Petitioner Wood was subjected to similar cross-examination at
his trial:
"Q. [By the prosecutor.] As a matter of fact you never told
anyone that you had been set up until today?
"A. [By Wood.] Yes, I believe I did, sir.
"Q. I assume you discussed it with your lawyer?
"A. Yes, I discussed it with my lawyer.
"Q. And you heard the testimony and witnesses against you?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. And wero you aware Mr. James was able to obtain a tape
transcript of the proceedings?
"A. Yes.
"Q. And you no doubt listened to those?
"A. Parts and portions of them—some of it.
"Q. But you never communicated your innocenoe?
"A. I believe I did one time to Mr. Beamer.
"Q. When might that have been?
"A. When in the jail house.
"Q. So you protested your innocence?
"A. In a little room. I believe he asked us how do you let
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mony and their adherence to counsel's advice not to take
the stand at the preliminary hearing; moreover, the decision not to divulge their defense prior to trial is probably attributable to counsel rather than to petitioners. 10
Nevertheless, unless and until this Court overrules Raff el
v. United States, 271 U. S. 494/ 1 I think a state court is
people get away with people setting up friends like this. He said
Bill Bonnell is not your friend and I said no, but I figured he was
a good enough acquaintance ho would do that.
"Q. Where was that?
"A. Little room there.
"Q. Ever been there before?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. When?
"Q. Did you see me there?
"A. I didn't know who you were at the time. I believe you
were in and out of there.
"Q. You didn't say anything to me, did you?
"A. No, I didn't know who you were then." Wood Tr. 470-472.
10
Under Ohio law, the preliminary hearing determines only
whether the defendant should be held for trial. The prosecution
need establish, at most, that a crime has been committed and that
there is "probable and reasonable cause" to hold the defendant
for trial, and the court need only find "substantial credible evidence"
of the charge against the defendant. Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§§2937.12, 2937.13 (Supp. 1973). Indeed, if a defendant has been
indicted, no hearing need be held. State v. Morris, 42 Ohio St. 2d
307, 326, 329 N. E. 2d 85, 97 (1975). Defense counsel thus will have
no incentive to divulge the defendant's case at the preliminary hearing if the prosecution has presented substantial evidence of guilt.
Since that was the case here, no significant impeaching inference may
be drawn from petitioners' silence at that proceeding.
Petitioners' failure to refer to the "frame" at any time between
arrest and trial is somewhat more probative; for if the "frame"
story were true, one would have expected counsel to try to persuade the prosecution to dismiss the charges in advance of trial.
11
Raffel was the last decision of this Court to address the constitutionality of admitting evidence of a defendant's prior silence
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free to regard the defendant's decision to take the stand
as a waiver of his objection to the use of his failure to
testify at an earlier proceeding or his failure to offer his
version of the events prior to trial.
B
In my judgment portions of the prosecutor's argument
to the jury overstepped permissible bounds. In each trial,
he commented upon the defendant's silence not only as
inconsistent with his testimony that he had been "framed/'
to impeach his testimony upon direct examination. Raffel had been
charged with conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition Act.
An agent testified at his first trial that he had admitted ownership
of a drinking place; Raffel did not take the stand. The trial ended
in a hung jury, and upon retrial, the agent testified as before.
Raffel elected to testify and denied making the statement, but he
was cross-examined on his failure to testify in the first trial. This
Court held that the evidence was admissible because Raffel had
completely waived the privilege against self-incrimination by deciding to testify. 271 U. S., at 499.
Subsequent cases, decided in the exercise of this Court's supervisory
powers, have diminished the force of Raj]el in the federal courts.
United States v. Hale, 422 U. S. 171; Stewart v. United States, 366
U. S. 1; Grunewald v. United States, 353 U. S. 391. All three of
these cases held that the defendant's prior silence or prior claim
of the privilege was inadmissible for purposes of impeachment; all
three distinguished Raffel on the ground that the Court there
assumed that the defendant's prior silence was significantly inconsistent with his testimony on direct examination. Hale, supra, at
175-176; Stewart, supra, at 5-7; Grunewald, supra, at 418-424.
Two of the three cases relied upon the need to protect the defendant's exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination from unwarranted inferences of guilt, a rationale that is not easily reconciled with the reasoning in Raffel that the decision to testify
constitutes a complete waiver of the protection afforded by the
privilege. Compare Hale, supra, at 180 and n. 7, and Grunewald,
supra, at 423-424, with Raffel, 271 U. S., at 499.
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but also as inconsistent with the defendant's innocence.12
Comment on the lack of credibility of the defendant is
plainly proper; it is not proper, however, for the prosecu12

At Doyle's trial, the prosecutor made the following arguments
to the jury:
"Diffuse what the true facts are; obscure the facts and prosecute
the prosecution.
"A typical and classic defense, but keep in mind, when you are
considering the testimony of the law enforcement officers involved,
that not until, Ladies and Gentlemen, not until the trial of this
case and prior to this case, the trial of Richard Wood's case, that
anybody connected with the prosecution in this case had any idea
what stories would be told by Jefferson Doyle and Richard Wood.
Not the foggiest idea. Both of them told you on the witness stand
that neither one of them said a word to the law enforcement officials on the scene—
"(continuing) on the scene at the point of their arrest, at the
Preliminary Hearing before Indictment in this case. Not a word
that they were innocent; that this was their position; that somehow, they had been 'set-up.'
"So, when you evaluate the testimony of the Law Enforcement
Officials, consider—
"(continuing)—what they had to deal with on the night in question and the months subsequent to that.
"Then they decide that they have been 'had' somehow. They
have been framed.
"Now, remember, this fits with the facts as observed by the law
enforcement officers except the basic, crucial facts. Somehow, they
have been framed. So, if you can believe this, Ladies and Gentlemen, they take off, chase Bill Bonnell around to give his money back
to him or ask him what he did to them, yet they don't bother to
tell the Law Enforcement Officers.
"It is unbelievable. I think, when you go to the Jury Room,
Ladies and Gentlemen, you are going to decide what really happened.
"We have the Fifth Amendment.

I agree with it. I t is funda-
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tor to ask the jury to draw a direct inference of guilt
from silence—to argue, in effect, that silence is inconsistent with innocence. But since the two inferences—permental to our sense and system of fairness, but if you are
innocent—
"(continuing)—if you are innocent, Ladies and Gentlemen, if you
have been framed, if you have been set-on, etc. etc. etc., as we
heard in Court these last days, you don't say, when the law enforcement officer says,—'You are under arrest,'—you don't say,—T
don't know what you are talking about.' You tell the truth. You
tell them what happened and you go from there. You don't say,—
T don't know what you are talking about,'— and demand to see
your lawyer and refuse to permit a search of your vehicle, forcing
the law enforcement agents to get a search warrant.
"If you're innocent, you just don't do it." Doyle Tr. 515-516,
519, 526.
At Wood's trial, ho made similar arguments:
"The defense in this case was very careful to make no statements at all until they had the benefit of hearing all the evidence
against them and had time to ascertain what they would admit and
what they would deny and how they could fit their version of the
story with the state's case. During none of this time did we ever
hear any business about a set up or frame or anything else. All
right.
"Yes, it is the law of our land, and rightfully so, ladies and
gentlemen, that nobody must be compelled to incriminate themselves. It is the 5th Amendment. No one can be forced to give
testimony against themselves where criminal action charges are
pending. It is a very fundamental right and I am glad we have it.
"The idea was nobody can convict himself out of his own mouth
and it grew out of the days when they used to whip and beat and
extract statements from the defendants and get them to convict
themselves out of their own mouth, and I am glad we have that
right.
"But ladies and gentlemen, there is one statement I am going to
make. If you are innocent, if you are innocent, if you have been
framed, if you have been set up as claimed in this case, when do
you tell it? When do you tell the policemen that?
"Think about it. After months—after various proceedings and
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jury and guilt—are inextricably intertwined because they
have a common source, it would be unrealistic to permit
comment on the former but to find reversible error in
the slightest reference to the latter. In the context
of the entire argument and the entire trial, I am not
persuaded that the rather sophisticated distinction between permissible comment on credibility and impermissible comment on an inference of guilt justifies a reversal
of these state convictions.13
Accordingly, although I have some doubt concerning
the propriety of the cross-examination about the preliminary hearing and consider a portion of the closing
argument improper, I would affirm these convictions.

for the first time? I am not going to say any more about that
but I want you to think about it." Closing Argument of the Prosecutor 12-14, supplementing Wood Tr.
13
Petitioner Doyle also argues that he was erroneously crossexamined at his trial on his failure to consent to a search of the
car he was driving at the time of the arrest. Petitioner Wood
appears to raise the similar claim that testimony of other witnesses
that he failed to consent to a search of the car was erroneously
admitted at his trial. The parties have not argued these issues
separately from the questions whether prior silence in various circumstances may be admitted to impeach a defendant or a defense
witness. It is apparent, however, that these questions implicate
Fourth Amendment issues that merit independent examination.
Accordingly, like the Court, I do not address them.
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HENDERSON, CORRECTIONAL SUPERINTENDENT v. MORGAN
CERTIORARI TO T H E UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE

SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 74-1529. Argued February 24, 1976—Decided June 17, 1976
Respondent was indicted for first-degree murder, but by agreement
with the prosecution and on counsel's advice respondent pleaded
guilty to second-degree murder and was sentenced. Subsequently,
after exhausting his state remedies in an unsuccessful attempt
to have his conviction vacated on the ground that his guilty plea
was involuntary, respondent filed a habeas corpus petition in
Federal District Court, alleging that his guilty plea was involuntary because, inter alia, he was not aware that intent to cause
death was an element of second-degree murder. The District
Court ultimately heard the testimony of several witnesses, including respondent and his defense counsel in the original prosecution; and the transcript of the relevant state-court proceedings and
certain psychological evaluations of respondent, who was substantially below average intelligence, were made part of the record.
On the basis of the evidence thus developed the District Court
found that respondent had not been advised by counsel or the
state court that an intent to cause death was an essential element
of second-degree murder, and, based on this finding, held that the
guilty plea was involuntary and had to be set aside. The Court
of Appeals affirmed. Held: Since respondent did not receive adequate notice of the offense to which he pleaded guilty, his plea
was involuntary and the judgment of conviction was entered without due process of law. The plea could not be voluntary in the
sense that it constituted an intelligent admission that he committed the offense unless respondent received "real notice of the
true nature of the charge against him, the first and most universally recognized requirement of due process/' Smith v.
O'Grady, 312 U. S. 329, 334. Where the record discloses that
defense counsel did not purport to stipulate that respondent had
the requisite intent or explain to him that his plea would be
admission of that fact, and he made no factual statement or admission necessarily implying that he had such intent, it is im-

